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COMMENTS

ing inequities whereby a person could avoid liability in the suit
by simply urging a provision of law designed to govern behavior
between husband and wife only. To minimize the disruption of
domestic tranquility, the procedural obstacle to tort suits should
remain intact, except inasmuch as they are permitted under the
direct action statute.
Reid K. Hebert

CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
Any system that combines a community estate and separate
estates for each spouse presupposes a distribution of liabilities
among them. Such a system obviously requires judicial caution
to prevent dishonest persons from defrauding creditors by
astute allocations of assets and liabilities among the community
and separate estates of the spouses.' Thus it is necessary to
distinguish between community debts and the separate debts of
either spouse, to determine which property is liable for what
debts, and to establish rules of priority between community and
separate creditors. Two terse code articles, 2 apparently Spanish in origin, 3 are the only significant legislative provisions on
community liability to third persons. 4 Lacking more detailed
legislative guidance, 5 the courts have been compelled to dispose
of cases on an ad hoc basis. The results are not always consistent, and some have been severely condemned as contrary to
basic principles of community property.6 Since 1920 consid1. For a doubtful case, see Thomas v. Vega, 185 La. 386, 169 So. 443 (1936).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2403 (1870) : "In the same manner, the debts contracted during the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains,
and must be acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband
and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their personal and
individual effects."
Id. art. 2409: "It is understood that, in the partition of the effects of the
partnership or community of gains, both husband and wife are to be equally
liable for their share of the debts contracted during the marriage, and not acquitted at the time of its dissolution."
3. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3,
8 (1959). FUERO REAL bk. 3, tit. 20, L. 114 (1255) may be the ultimate source
of the concluding portion of art. 2403.
4. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 131 (1870), apparently copied from FRENCH
CIVIL CODE art. 220 (1804).
5. Compare the more comprehensive dispositions of SPANISH CIVIL CODE arts.
1408-1411 (1889) and FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1409-1420 (1804) with LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 2403, 2409 (1870).
6. 1DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 438-39, 456-57 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAI]. It may be doubted that there are "general
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erable uncertainty has been introduced by the married women's

emancipation statutes 7 and the judicial decision to treat the
wife as owner of half the community during marriage. 8 This
Comment examines the rights of creditors, community and separate, in an effort to delineate their position in present Louisiana law.9
Classificationof Debts
As the sketchy treatment of community liabilities in the
Civil Code does not include identification of separate and community debts contracted during marriage, the courts have been
obliged to invent modes of classifying such debts. Two methods
of classifying debts have developed: by the first, debts are classified according to their nature; by the second, according to
which spouse incurred them. Article 2403 speaks of "debts contracted during the marriage," without exception, as community

debts. Nevertheless the courts early recognized that some debts
incurred during the marriage are not community debts but separate debts of one spouse.1 Indeed, once it became settled law
principles of community property" based on some ideal community property system as De Funiak seems to suggest. Rather, there appears to be numerous community property systems, each adapted to the legal system of which it is a part,
and each having its own principles which are not necessarily applicable to other
community systems.
7. Now compiled in LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
8. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926) is the root decision.
Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954), considered in text accompanying note 173 infra, is a branch of the doctrine which is pertinent to creditors.
9. This Comment treats the legal community only. To a certain extent, the
parties in a conventional community may alter the rights of creditors. For example, if the marriage contract stipulates the ratio of the community to which
the wife is entitled on its dissolution, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, she is liable for no greater ratio of the debts. Succession of Coco, 32 La.
Ann. 325 (1880).
10. Dickerman v. Reagan, 2 La. Ann. 440, 441 (1847): "It is true, that
debts contracted during the marriage enter into the community of gains, and must
be acquitted out of the common fund. C.C. art. 2372 [1825 Code]. But this
provision applies to the partners alone, and regulates their rights between themselves, upon a settlement of the community at its dissolution. It has no application to creditors, and does not deprive them of their recourse against the wife,
during marriage, for debts contracted for her separate advantage, and for which
she is individually liable." No authority was cited for its rationalization of
liability. The court's rationalization has not been followed, but it is settled that
the wife's debt may be her separate debt. See Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck,
243 La. 1084, 150 So. 2d 23 (1963) ; Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115
So. 575 (1928) ; Rahier v. Rester, 11 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; Godchaux & Mayer, Ltd. v. Richardson, 123 So. 178 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929). A
series of cases holding the wife personally liable for a broker's fee when she
defaulted on a contract to sell immovable property, due to her inability to convey
community immovables, have the same import. See Nelson v. Holden, 219 La.
37, 52 So. 2d 240 (1951) ; Mathews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La. 1069, 126 So. 556
(1930) ; Uchello v. Arnold, 135 So. 81 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931).
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that there could be acquisitions under onerous title for the separate estate of either spouse during marriage," separate debts
were a necessary corollary to prevent unjust enrichment of one
spouse at the expense of the other. Logically, if the property
acquired is community property, the purchase price should be
a community debt; if the property acquired is separate property, the purchase price should be a separate debt. 1'2 Classifica-

tion based on the nature of the debt, if consistently applied,
would conveniently dispose of all debts resulting from acquisition of property. Such classification is less convenient in the

allocation of debts for services rendered' 3 or obligations im-

posed by law,' 4 although the principle must be considered. In

these cases a different mode of classifying debts has been frequently employed, based on which spouse incurred the debt.
From the premise that the husband is head and master of the
community, 15 the conclusion is reached that as his assent is
necessary to obligate the community, a debt contracted by the

wife without his assent must be a debt of her separate estate
only.' 0 Unhappily, this approach has also been employed in
cases concerning the acquisition of property. 7 In recent years
there has been a reaction against relieving the community of
liability for debts incurred by the wife,' and the classification
of debts by determining which spouse incurred the debt has be]1. This is well settled. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 95 (1964).
12. The principle is useful and explains many decisions. However, it is not
universally applied, and the converse certainly is not true: property purchased
with the separate funds of the husband may fall into the community for want
of proper recitals in the act of sale, or property purchased with the separate
funds of the wife may fall into the community for want of proof that she administered such funds. See Comment, 25 LA. L. Rsv. 95 (1964).
13. Attorney fees for services rendered the wife in a suit for divorce, for example, have been troublesome. See note 114 infra.
14. For example, damages owed for a tort of the wife may be a community
obligation. See text accompanying note 237 infra.
15. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404

(1870).

16. Tucker v. Carlin, 14 La. Ann. 734 (1859) : "Being head and master of
the community, and rigorously bound as above, the law has given him absolute
control over the debts and contracts of the community, and no man can pretend
to a debt against the community . . . in virtue of a contract, without his consent." In the case, an attorney who represented the wife in an unsuccessful divorce action failed to collect his fee from the community. This is not current
law, but the case is a good illustration of the court's mode of classifying debts.
17. See Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115 So. 575 (1928); KellerZander, Inc. v. Copeland, 196 So. 527 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940); Lacaze v.
Kelsoe, 185 So. 676 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Sizeler v. Pino, 119 So. 904 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
18. Conley v. Johnson, 98 So. 2d 847, 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) : "We are
not unmindful that in everyday life the wife does the greater part of the buying
for the community and instances are legion where such contracts as this are
entered into by the wife in which the husband may or may not have full knowledge."
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come hopelessly entangled with the problem of the wife's power
to obligate the community. 19 It remains true, however, that
some debts are community debts and some are not. Both systems of classification are still used, probably of necessity, but
it is believed that classification according to the nature of the
debt should be the general rule and classification according to
which spouse incurred the debt the exception.
Community Debts
"[I]t is a primary principle of the community property system that community property is subject to the payment of only
those debts contracted during the marriage which concern the
actual marriage and the conjugal partnership and were contracted on its account. ' 20 The stated principle is useful, provided that no narrow view is taken as to what debts concern
the conjugal partnership. If debts are to be classified as separate or community according to their nature, the extent of community interests must first be known in order to identify the
21
sources of community liabilities.
In the absence of donations, the legal community lbegins
with a single asset - a right which amounts to a usufruct of
the separate property of both spouses. 22 With the capital so obtained, and that resulting from the labor and industry of the
spouses, 23 property may be acquired which is owned by the community. The expenses occasioned by such property -the
cost
of its acquisition, defense, repair, and expenses incurred in
making the property productive - are, logically, community
debts. 24 Since the community has, in effect, the usufruct of the
separate property of the spouses, then, as any other usufructuary,25 the community should bear some of the expenses which
concern the separate property. 26 Finally, the expense of sup19. The problem is considered in text accompanying note 203 infra.
20. 1 DE FUNIAK 438. See note 6 supra.

21. There is some indication that Washington adopts a similar view by requiring that the community "benefit" from the transaction if it is to be held
liable for the debt. The question has arisen in cases where the husband acts as
surety. See Horton v. Donohoe Kelly Banking Co., 15 Wash. 399, 46 Pac. 409
(1896) ; 1 DE FUNIAK § 163; Mecham, Creditor's Rights in Community Property, 11 WASH. L. REV. 80, 87 (1936).
22. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2386, 2402 (1870) ; Comment, 25 LA. L. REV.
95 (1964).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
24. 9 MANRESA, COMMENTARIOS AL C6DIGO CIVIL ESPAIR0L 603 (5th ed. 1950)
[hereinafter cited as MANRESA].
25. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 570, 571, 578 (1870).
26. 9 MANRESA 603: "Ademds la sociedad de gananciale8 es realemete la
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porting the family should be borne by the community, for one
function of a community property system is to provide an economic base for the family. 27 Thus most debts contracted during the marriage concern the community, a fact which provides
a rational basis for the presumption that debts so contracted
28
are community debts.
Debts which represent the purchase price of property acquired during marriage are usually classified as community or
separate according to the community or separate status of the
property acquired. 29 It seems self-evident that the purchase
price of community property is a community debt. That the
wife enjoyed the use of the property 3° or that she selected the
property acquired l does not alter the result: if the property
acquired is community property, the purchase price is a community debt, not her separate'debt.3 2 Nor should the result be
different if the wife is the spouse who acquires the property
for the community; if there is a valid acquisition of community
property, classification of the resulting debt should not depend
upon determination of the wife's power to obligate the community. In some cases, acquisitions of immovable property by
usufrucuaria de las bienes privativos de cada cdnyuge, p asi como tiene todo8 los
derechos inherenteg al usufructo, ha de tener forzosamente todas las cargas del
mismo." Cf. Hall & Lisle v. Wyche, 31 La. Ann. 734 (1879).
27. See 9 MANRESA 5-6, 14, 603. Cf. Berdejo, En Torno a la Naturaleza
Juridica de la Communidad de Gananciales del Codigo Civil, 187 REVISTA GENERAL DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA 7, 21-22 (1950).
28. See Succession of Sangpiel, 114 La. 767, 38 So. 554 (1905) ; Hall & Lisle
v. Wyche, 31 La. Ann. 734 (1879); Van Wickle v. Violet, 30 La. Ann. 1106
(1878) ; Graham v. Thayer, 29 La. Ann. 75 (1877) ; Surls v. Hienn, 20 La. Ann.
229 (1868); Kennedy v. Bossiere, 16 La. Ann. 445 (1862); Draughon v. Ryan,
16 La. Ann. 309 (1861) ; Graham v. Egan, 13 La. Ann. 546 (1858) ; Lobit &
Charpentier v. Harman, 13 La. Ann. 593 (1858); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v.
Bordelon, 198 So. 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) ; Bank of Montgomery v. Calhoun, 146 So. 51 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933). See also 1 DE FUNIAK 453; DAGGEf
,
THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 50 (1945) [hereinafter cited
as DAGGETT]. Cf. Fox v. Weissbach, 76 Ariz. 91, 259 P.2d 258 (1953) ; Cauthen
v. Cauthen, 53 N.M. 458, 210 P.2d 942 (1949) ; Foster v. Hackworth, 164
S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Olympia Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. MeCroskey,
172 Wash. 148, 19 P.2d 671 (1933).
29. See Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1954) ; Whittington v. Pegues, 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928) ; Moniotte v. Lieux, 41 La. Ann.
528, 6 So. 817 (1889) ; Graham v. Thayer, 29 La. Ann. 75 (1877) ; Lemoine v.
Powers, 25 La. Ann. 514 (1873) ; Lobit & Charpentier v. Harman, 13 La. Ann.
593 (1858) ; Seignouret & Co. v. Gardanne, 9 La. Ann. 4 (1854) ; Davidson v.
Stuart, 10 Rob. 146 (La. 1836) ; Brock Furniture Co. v. Carroll, 86 So. 2d 715
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) ; Lotz v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 17 So. 2d 46.3 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1944); Standard Mfg. Co. v. Dupuis, 6 La. App. 476 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1927).
30. Lobit & Charpentier v. I-arman, 13 La. Ann. 593 (1858) ; Ward v. Trimble, 20 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
31. Seignouret & Co. v. Gardanne, 9 La. Ann. 4 (1854).
32. See cases cited in notes 30 and 31 supra.
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the wife have been held to be community property, with the
result that the purchase price is a community debt, without in-

quiry into the wife's power to obligate the community.33 Where
movable property is so acquired, the tendency has been to ignore
the community status of the acquired property and to investigate the power of the wife to obligate the community.3 4 The
sounder approach, it seems, in all cases where the debt is created
by the acquisition of property, is to determine the status of
the property, and to classify the debt as separate or community
accordingly.3 5

Liability for the purchase price is only the first of community debts flowing from the acquisition of community property. Taxes,3 6 repairs,3 7 ordinary operating expenses 3 8-in fine,

the community is subject to the liabilities of any other proprietor. 39 By their nature, all such debts are community debts,
33. See Succession of Franek, 224, La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1954) ; Fortier v.
Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904); Bouligny v. Fortier, 16 La. Ann. 209
(1861) ; Lotz v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 17 So. 2d 463 (La. App. lst Cir.
1944). The cases are legion in which property acquired by the wife is held to be
community property. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964). But 8ee Parham v. Gaspard, 26 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) for a decision that the
wife cannot acquire immovable property for the community without the husband's written authority to act as agent.
34. See Schaeffer v. Trascher, 105 La. 315, 115 So. 575 (1928) ; Montgomery
v. Gremillion, 69 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953) ; Mathews Furniture Co.
v. LaBella, 44 So. 2d 160 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Lacaze v. Kelsoe, 185 So.
676 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Sizeler v. Pino, 119 So. 904 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1929). Some cases classify the resulting debt by the community status of the
property acquired. See Brock Furniture Co. v. Carroll, 86 So. 2d 715 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1956) ; Philip Werlein Co. v. Madsen, 120 So. 237 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1929) ; Standard Mfg. Co. v. Dupuis, 6 La. App. 476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1927).
35. The power of the wife may be a pertinent inquiry in classifying the property acquired, but justice seems better served by making classification of the
property acquired the basis of classifying resulting debt. The status of the property is an easily administered test: the law applicable in classification of property is generally well settled; the law applicable in determining the power of the
wife to obligate the community is complex and uncertain.
36. See Tate v. Tate, 12 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943). Cf. Schoeffner
v. Schoeffner, 167 La. 208, 118 So. 890 (1928) (paving lien).
37. Dickinson Motors Co. v. Sullivan, 6 La. App. 329 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1927).
38. See Ruffino v. Hunt, 234 La. 91, 99 So. 2d 34 (1958) ; Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. v. Modica, 139 So. 80 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932) ; Smithson v.
Jones, 130 So. 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) ; Perfection Garment Co. v. Lanasa,
7La. App. 31 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1927).
39. 9 MANRESA 604: "La sociedad adquiere un insaueble, par ejemplo; too
gaitos de escritura, impue8ta do derechos reales e incripcion correna su cargo. A
ella incumben los gastos de cultivo y recoleccion, reparaciones ordinarias o ex
$raordinariasque exijan, el pago de las contribuciones o de las cargas que LQ
affecten, las costas o desembolsas que pueda originar su defensa judicial o extrajudicial, etc. Lo que se dice de un inmueble se aplica igualmente a un crddito, a
un ganado, a una empresa mercantil o industrial, etc. La sociedad es proprietaria, V como tal, asi coma goza de todos los derechos de un proprietaria,y sufre
todas la8 obligaciones que incumben al mismo."
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and it is immaterial which spouse incurred them. 40 The community, not the separate estate of either spouse, has received
the benefit for which remuneration is due41 and justice requires
that the community pay the debt.
Community liability for debts incurred on account of the

separate estate of either spouse is not well defined, but such
liability is less extensive than community liability incurred on
account of community property. Clearly the community should
not be liable for the purchase price of property which is separate property of one of the spouses. 42 Since the community receives the income of the separate estate of either spouse,'4 8 by
analogy the community should bear the same types of expenses
incurred by the separate estates that the usufructuary must
bear. Louisiana courts have properly charged the community
with ordinary operating expenses of separate property.44 The
early cases to the contrary 45 should be disapproved on principle
and considered overruled by Succession of Ratcliff.46 Likewise,
40. See the striking case, Conley v. Johnson, 98 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1957), in which the community was held liable to a carrier who, pursuant to a
contract with the wife, moved a house belonging to the community. In such cases,
the concept of the husband as head and master of the community yields to fact
that a benefit has been conferred upon the community.
41. Taxes are an exception. The community is liable for taxes on community
property because it is the proprietor.
42. This follows from the principle that separate property is acquired by an
investment of funds which are separate in origin. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV.
95 (1964). It has usually been assumed that the purchase price of the wife's
paraphernal property is her separate debt. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation & Refinery, 152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Shevnin v. Grimmer,
119 So. 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) ; Demack Motors Co. v. Hallick, 119 So.
572 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929). During the marriage, the purchase price of separate property of the husband can be satisfied from either community or his
separate property. See text accompanying note 179 infra. At the dissolution of
the community, however, the debt is treated as a separate debt of the husband.
See, e.g., Pennison v. Pennison, 157 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
43. Exceptionally, the income from the wife's paraphernal property may be
her separate property. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870). Likewise, the earnings of the wife may be her separate property if husband and wife live separate
and apart. Id. art. 2334.
44. See Succession of Ratcliff, 209 La. 224, 24 So. 2d 456 (1945) ; Courrege
v. Colgin, 51 La. Ann. 1069, 25 So. 942 (1899) ; Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann.
216, 23 So. 337 (1897); Wells v. Norton, 28 La. Ann. 300 (1876) ; Wilcox v.
Henderson, 9 La. Ann. 347 (1854) ; Harris v. Harris, 160 So. 2d 358 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964).
45. Succession of Penny, 14 La. Ann. 194 (1859) ; Patterson v. Frazer, 8 La.
Ann. 512 (1852) ; Dailey v. Pierson, 5 La. Ann. 125 (1850) ; Dickerman v. Reagan, 2 La. Ann. 440 (1847).
46. 209 La. 224, 238, 24 So. 2d 456, 460 (1945) : "Since the profits of the
separate property, under the administration of the husband, fall into the community, it is but just, equitable and proper that the ordinary expenditures required
in the production of such profits and in the preservation of the property should be
borne by the community." See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 570 (1870) : "The usufructuary is liable to all the necessary expenses for the preservation and working
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minor repairs, 47 but perhaps not major repairs, 48 taxes, 49 and
interest on the mortgage indebtedness of a separate estate"

are community debts. 51 Such decisions are probably necessary.
The income from the separate estate falls into the community,
with the consequence that the separate estate could pay such
debts only by a depletion of capital. The decision to obligate
the community instead is more logical as a matter of justice and
economics.
The everyday expenses of supporting the family are com-

munity debts. 52 This can be deduced from the Code itself. The
husband is personally liable for these expenses, 53 but it is con54
templated that they shall be defrayed in part by the dowry,
of the estates subject to the usufruct."

Of. 9 MANRESA. 604-05.

FRENCH CIVIL

CODE art. 1409 (1804) places some obligations of the usufructuary on the community.
47. See Courrege v. Colgin, 51 La. Ann. 1069, 25 So. 942 (1899).
48. The analogy to the obligations of the usufructuary suggests that the community should not be liable for extraordinary repairs. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
571-572 (1870). SPANISH CIvI CODE art. 1408 (1889) expressly so provides.
However, art. 2408 of the Louisiana Civil Code may contemplate that such expenses are to be borne by the community. Cf. Giamanco v. Giamanco, 131 So. 2d
159 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
49. See Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 578 (1870) for the obligation of the usufructuary.
50. See Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902). Accord, FRENCH
CIVIL CODE art. 1409 (1804) ; SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1408 (1889).
But see
Mathews v. Hansberry, 71 So. 2d 232 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954). Cf. 3 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE

(AN

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY THE LOUISIANA

STATE

LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1122 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Planiol] : "Because law
gives the community usufruct of the spouses' separate property, it charges the
community with the payment of interests or arrears due to their separate creditors (Art. 1409-3). Interest is usually paid from current income which goes to
the community. Hence it is natural that community should pay the spouses'
annual interest charges."
51. Most cases previously cited deal with expenses incurred on immovable
property. Two cases dealing with automobiles may be deviations from the principle established in the cases just considered. Dickinson Motors Co. v. Sullivan,
6 La. App. 329 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) treated repairs to an automobile, the
wife's separate property, as creating a separate debt for which the community
was not liable. Godchaux & Mayer v. Richardson, 123 So. 178 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1929) held that premiums for insurance on an automobile, the wife's separate property, were separate debts. But cf. Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506
(1884). In both cases it may be questioned from what source the wife's separate
estate was to derive funds for payment of the debt. If the automobile served
community purposes, on principle, the community should have been obliged to
answer for the debts.
52. Cf. SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1408 (1889) : "Serdn de cargo de la sociedad de gananciales: . . . 50 El sostenimiento de la familia. V la educacidn de hijos
comunes y de los legitimos de uno solo de los cdnyuges." FRENCH CIVIL CODE art.
1405 (1804) : "La communautd se compose passivement ....
50 Des aliments
des 6poux, de l'education et entretien des enfants, et toute autre charge du
mariage."
53. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 120 (1870).

54. Id. art. 2337: "By dowry is meant the effects which the wife brings to
the husband to support the expenses of the marriage."
Id. art. 2349: "The income or proceeds of the dowry belong to the husband,
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or by the income of the wife's property if all her property is
paraphernal and under her administration, 5 or if the spouses
are separate in property. 56 In other words, if the wife contributes neither dowry nor available property to the community of
gains, she is personally liable for a portion of the living expenses. Manifestly the intent is that such expenses shall be
borne by the community if there is one.
Thus the items of ordinary living expense such as food, 57
housing, 58 clothing, 59 medical expenses, 60 and without doubt the

expenses incurred for the comfort and recreation of the family,o6 are expenses the community must bear.62 The expense of
providing education for the children of the marriage likewise
is a community obligation.65 Although these debts are by their

and are intended to help him support the charges of the marriage, such as the
maintenance of the husband and wife, that of their children, and other expenses
which the husband deems proper."
55. Id. art. 2389 (1870) : "If all the property of the wife is paraphernal,
and she have reserved to herself the administration of it, she ought to bear a
portion of the marriage charges, equal, if need be, to one half her income." This
provision apparently derives from FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1575 (1804) making
the wife liable up to one-third of her income. La. Civil Code art. 57, p. 334
(1808) is identical with the French Code article; the change of proportion was
made without comment in the 1825 Code. In the circumstances mentioned in the
article, the wife's separate estate would contribute nothing to the community of
gains; therefore, she is made personally liable for a portion of the ordinary living
expenses. To the same effect is LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2395 (1870) : "Each of the
married persons separate in property, contribute to the expenses of the marriage
in the manner agreed on by contract; if there be no agreement on this subject,
the wife contributes to the amount of one half of her income." This provision
was introduced in the Code of 1825 and probably borrowed from FRENCH CIVIL
CODE art. 1537 (1804). The provisions are seldom enforced in Louisiana. See
Rowley v. Rowley, 19 La. 557 (1841) ; Madison v. Jackson, 131 So. 736 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1928). Cf. Bank of Lafayette & Trust Co. v. Fabre, 169 La. 1185,
126 So. 916 (1930) ; De Lesdernier v. De Lesdernier, 45 La. Ann. 1364, 14 So.
191 (1893).
56. See note 55 supra.
57. See Chaix v. Villejoin, 7 La. 276 (1834) ; Smith v. Viser, 117 So. 2d 673
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) ; Breaux v. Decuir, 49 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1950).
58. See Rouchon v. Rocamora, 84 So. 2d 873 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956). Cf.
Spring v. Barr, 120 So. 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
59. See Trudeau v. Row, 23 La. Ann. 197 (1871) ; D. H. Holmes Co. v.
Huth, 49 So. 2d 875 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). But cf. Garst & Levy v. Loeb, 8
La. App. 221 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928), holding the wife personally liable for
child's clothes bought on credit; liability based on married women's emancipation
acts. Very doubtful.
60. See Succession of Casey, 130 La. 743, 58 So. 556 (1912) ; Choppin v.
Harmon, 24 La. Ann. 301 (1876) ; Tate v. Tate, 12 So. 506 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1943) ; Jones v. Davis, 155 So. 269 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; Beal v. Ward,
127 So. 423 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930) ; Overton v. Nordyke, 120 So. 544 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
61. Cf. Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 432-33, 46 So. 2d 614, 617 (1950)
"The wife is entitled to her own recreation, enjoyment and pleasures as well as
the husband and the community owes her these things in the same manner it
owes her the food or the clothes she requires."
62. See 9 MANRESA 607-08.
63. See St. Louis Univ. v. Prudhomme, 21 La. Ann. 525 (1869). The Span-
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nature community debts, it is in such cases that the court has
frequently inquired into the power of the wife to obligate the
community and has evolved ingenious theories by which she
may do so.6 This inquiry seems unnecessary. Debts incurred
in supporting the family are community debts and ultimately
the community must pay them. Even if it is decided in a particular case that the wife must pay, as she lacked power to
obligate the community, on payment the wife obtains a right
of reimbursement at the settlement of the community. 5 Justice
seems better served by making the community originally pay
debts which are community debts by their nature, for many
just claims for reimbursement are lost because of the difficulty
in establishing such claims.66
Separate Debts
Having explored the general types of debts which are community debts, it may now be inquired what debts remain as
separate debts. Clearly debts contracted previous to the marriage or after its dissolution are separate debts, for there is
no existing community at the time of their creation. 67 Funeral
ish Civil Code expressly provides that maintenance and education of the legiti-

mate children of either spouse is a community obligation. See note 52 supra. If
the matter were put to test in Louisiana, our courts would probably agree. Of.
Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
64. See text accompanying note 209 infra. One of the principal theories, based
on the husband's personal liability for necessaries, is not uniformly successful in
obligating the community. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115 So.
575 (1928).
65. Denegre v. Denegre, 30 La. Ann. 275, 277 (1878): "[I]f the community
has been enriched by the separate funds of either spouse it is indebted pro tanto
at the dissolution to the separate estate of such spouse whose funds have so
enriched it, and this is as much a debt of the community as if it were due to a
third person." See Glasscock v. Green, 4 La. Ann. 146 (1849) ; McIntosh v.
Smith, 2 La. Ann. 756 (1847). See also Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property in Louisiana, 27 Tiu. L. REv. 143 (1953);
Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 108 (1964).
66. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property
in Louisiana, 27 TuL. L. REv. 143 (1953); Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 151
(1964).
67. L&. CiviL CODE art. 2403 (1870). See Harman & Stringfellow v. Legrande, 151 La. 253, 91 So. 726 (1922) ; Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485,
16 So. 481 (1894) ; Ruthenberg v. Hellberg, 43 La. Ann. 440, 9 So. 99 (1890) ;
Thezan v. Thezan, 28 La. Ann. 442 (1876); Markham v. Allen, 22 La. Ann.
513 (1870) ; Waring v. Zunts, 16 La. Ann. 49 (1861) ; Childers v. Johnson, 6
La. Ann. 456 (1851); Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848); Thompson v.
Waterhouse, 157 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Keyser v. James, 153
So. 2d 97 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Succession of Evans, 8 Orl. App. 196 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1911). Which of these debts may be enforced against the community in spite of their separate character is considered in text accompanying
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expenses, for example, of either spouse are a separate debt for
this reason.6 8 The debts incurred during marriage which are
separate debts compose a limited group. If separate property
is acquired by onerous title, the purchase price is a separate
debt. 69 Extraordinary repairs on separate property perhaps
should be classified as separate debts. 70 It has previously been
observed that if the community enjoys the income from the
separate property, it bears the obligations of a usufructuary
in regard to expenses incurred on account of that property.
Paraphernal property of the wife in some instances is outside
this principle, for if the conditions of article 2386 are met, income from paraphernalia administered by the wife inures to
her separate estate and does not enter the community of gains.
In such cases, all expenses incurred on account of the paraphernalia should be classified as separate debts. 71 Certain obligations imposed by law create separate debts: tort liability, 72 presumably fines imposed for violation of law, 78 some quasi-connote 179 infra. But cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 235 La. 226, 103 So. 2d 263 (1958) :
After judicial separation, the spouses continued to operate a former community
business for two years. Business creditors of this period were entitled to payment by preference on partition of the community on the theory that the spouses
had formed a partnership. The court recognized that the creditors were not community creditors.
68. Maggio v. Papa, 206 La. 38, 51, 18 So. 2d 645, 649-50 (1944) : "It is
well settled that the surviving spouse's interest in the community property cannot be sold to pay the funeral expenses incurred after the dissolution of the community of acquets and gains resulting from the death of the departed spouse and
that this expense should be deducted from the deceased's half interest in the
community." Accord, Womack v. McCook Bros. Funeral Home, 194 La. 296,
193 So. 652 (1940) ; Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 701, 75 So. 498 (1917) ; Payton v. Jones, 38 So. 2d 631 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949) ; Succession of Lewis, 12
So. 2d 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) ; Succession of Solis, 119 So. 768 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1929). But see McCook v. Comengys, 160 La. 701, 125 So. 860 (1929).
Husband being out of state when wife died, her friends arranged the funeral.
Husband was held liable, apparently by quasi-contract, to the undertaker. Id. at
705, 125 So. at 861: "The proof shows that defendant was not, prior to the demand for payment, informed as to the price of the casket, and that he is a man
of limited means, but as he was present at the funeral and permitted the casket
to be used without inquiry or protest, which under the harrowing circumstances
existing, might reasonably have been expected, he is, in our opinion liable
to the plaintiff for the replacement cost of the casket, together with such sum
in excess thereof as will compensate the plaintiff for such possible loss as he
might have sustained." Similar efforts to hold the husband liable for funeral
expenses of the wife were unsuccessful in Pace v. Trichel, 98 So. 2d 690 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1957).
69. This is in accordance with the theory that such acquisitions are a reinvestment of separate funds. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 95 (1964). Of.
Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution from Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1952).
70. See note 48 supra.
71. Cf. Shevnin v. Grimmer, 119 So. 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
72. See Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937). Tort liability
of the community is possible. See text accompanying note 237 infra.
73. No Louisiana case was found which considered the question. Early Span-
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tractual obligations,74 and in some cases, damages for breach
of contract 75 come within this category.76 Louisiana has not yet
been faced with the problem of classifying the debt resulting
from a trustee's breach of trust. Factors deserving consideration are numerous and variable enough 77 that the classification
ish law supports the text, for it provided that one spouse should not lose separate property nor the moiety of the community for a crime of the other. LEYES
DE Toao L. 77 (1505) :"Por eldelicto que el marido, 6 la muger cometiere aunque
sea do heregia, 6 do otra qualquier qualidad no pierda el uno por el delicto dot
otro sus bienes, ni la mitad de las ganancias avidos durante el matrimonio: tnandamos que sean avidos por bienes de ganancias todo lo multiplicado durante el
matrimonio, fasta que por el tat delicto los bienes de qualquier dellos sean declaranto por sentencia, aunque el delicto sea qualidad que imponga la pena ipso
juris." The provision was carried forward in substance in NUEVA RECOPILATION
bk. 5, tit. 9, L. 10 (1567) and NOVISIMA RECOPILACION bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 10
(1805). The principle was approved by Spanish writers throughout the years.
See 1 Asso Y MANUEL, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA 95 (7th
ed. 1806) [hereinafter cited as Asso Y MANUEL]; AZEVEDO, COMMENTARIORUM
transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY
IUaIS CIVILIS IN HISPANIAE REGIAS (1597),
PROPERTY LAWS 198-202 (1940) [hereinafter cited as AZEVEDo with page reference to ROBINS transl.] ; 2 LLAMAS Y MOLINA, COMENTARTO A LAS LEYES DE
ToRo 507-17 (3d ed. 1853) [hereinafter cited as LLAMAS Y MOLINA] ; MATIENZO,
COMMENTARIA (1597), transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY PROPEaTY LAWS 12830 (1940) [hereinafter cited as MATIENZO with page reference to ROBBINS

transl.]. The principle was preserved in SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1410 (1889),
but in weakened form, for in some circumstances, "las multas y condenas pecuniarias" of either spouse may be enforced against community property, a claim
to reimbursement arising in favor of the innocent spouse. 9 MANRESA 625-26 is
unsympathetic to the innovation. Cf. Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d
699 (1936) ; McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 74 P.2d 1181 (1938), which
seems to parallel the old Spanish law. In France, however, the community is
liable for fines against the husband; but when a sentence of civil death was possible, French law provided that such a sentence did not confiscate the wife's
interest in the community. See 3 PLANIOL no. 1086-1989; FRENCH CIVIL CODE
arts. 1424, 1425 (1804).
74. If a wife received a dation en paienent of property which is classified as
paraphernal, and the transaction is such that it gives the grantor an action to
recover the property for payment of a thing not due, it seems the wife and not
the community should be liable to him. But cf. Cousins v. Kelsey, 33 La. Ann.
880 (1881). Wife acted as depositary to the knowledge of the husband. Held,
the community is liable to the depositor for the return of the thing. The implication is that the wife alone is liable if she acted without the husband's knowledge.
75. Since compensatory damages are in lieu of performance, liability should
be community or separate depending on whether the community or a separate
estate was liable for the performance of the contract. Where a wife enters a
listing contract with a real estate broker but is unable to convey title to the property listed because it belongs to the community, her separate estate is liable for
the broker's fee, or for liquidated damages if the contract so stipulates. Nelson
v. Elolden, 219 La. 37, 52 So. 2d 240 (1951) ; Mathews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La.
1069, 126 So. 556 (1930) ; Uchello v. Arnold, 135 So. 81 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1931).
76. Cf. Sciambra v. Sciambra, 153 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied: "Likewise, the $1980.00 rent allowed for the community property
occupied by the mother and aunt of the husband, was the legal obligation of the
husband (LSA-C.C. Art. 239), which he could not impose upon the dissolved
community. This item was fixed on expert testimony, and the Trial Court was
correct. To charge this rent to the community would, in effect, permit the husband to exploit the community for his personal benefit."
77. Some of the factors are the following: Is the trustee receiving compensation? If so, is that compensation community or separate property? Is the trustee
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need not be the same in all cases, but it is suspected that the
injured beneficiary will be allowed redress against the commu78
nity and the trustee-spouse.
The modern law governing divorce and separation from bed
and board has made possible a new group of separate debts.
The Code provides that the husband cannot lawfully contract
a community debt during the pendency of a suit for separation
or divorce. 79 It has been twice decided that debts contracted by
the husband during this period are not nullities but are his
separate debts. 80 Since the Code amendment making a judgment of separation from bed and board retroactive to the date
of filing suit,8s it may well follow that debts incurred by either
spouse during the pendency of the suit are now separate debts,
as the debts were contracted, in legal effect, after the dissolution of the community. Alimony pendente lite is a useful test
case. The cases are in conflict whether alimony pendente lite is
a community debt or the husband's separate debt. 2 Messersmith v. Messersmith5 makes alimony pendente lite a commualso a beneficiary of the trust? Is the trustee also a settlor of the trust, as is
possible under the new Trust Code? Which spouse is the trustee? Did the other
spouse have knowledge of or participate in the breach of trust? Did the other
spouse benefit from the breach of trust?
78. Perhaps the closest analogy is that of a father who, during the second
community, receives money belonging to his child of the first marriage. The second community is held liable for principal and interest. See H-arrell v. Crow,

214 La. 543, 38 So. 2d 226 (1948) ; Succession of Waechter, 131 La. 505, 59 So.
918 (1912); Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884). Although the decisions can be otherwise explained, it is believed that the fiduciary relationship
was a large'factor.
79. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 150 (1870) : "From the day on which the action for
separation shall be brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract
any debt on account of the community, nor to dispose of the immovables belonging to the same, and any alienation by him made after that time shall be
null, if it be proved that such alienation was made with the fraudulent view of
injuring the rights of the wife." The article is also applicable to divorce suits.
Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied. The
article was probably derived from FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 271 (1804). Some
Spanish writers expressed the opinion that the community was modified upon
a separation in fact of the spouses. If the separation was the fault of the husband, the wife was entitled to a share of his future acquisitions (as they fell into
the community) but he is entitled to no share of her future acquisitions. The
same principle applies in reverse if the separation was the fault of the wife.
See AZEVEDO 146; MATIENZO 41-45. On like reasoning, liability for debts would
also be modified by separation.
80. Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied; Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied.
81. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870), as amended.

82. Community: Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169
(1956) ; Uchello v. Uchello, 220 La. 1061, 58 So. 2d 385 (1952) ; White v.
White, 159 La. 1065, 106 So. 567 (1925) ; Hill v. Hill, 115 La. 489, 39 So. 503
(1905) ; Dauterive v. Sternfels, 164 So. 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935). Separate:
Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942).
83. 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
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nity debt on the theory that the community was dissolved only
4
on the date of the judgment of separation; Talbert v. Talbert,
an earlier case, held it was the husband's separate debt on the
theory that the judgment was retroactive to the date of filing
suit.8 If the court continues the reasoning of these cases, the
1962 amendment makes alimony pendente lite the husband's
separate debt.8 6 Other debts incurred during the pendency of
a suit for separation may be classified as separate debts for
7
the same reason.
Rights of Community Creditors
Community creditors enjoy a favored position in Louisiana
law. Their position may be summarized in four propositions.
Community property is liable for community debts. The community creditor may also satisfy his claim from the husband's
separate estate, but usually not from the wife's separate estate.
On dissolution of the community, its creditors enjoy a priority
over the interests of both spouses and their separate creditors
in relation to the community property. After dissolution of the
community, community debts may follow community property.
There is authority for all four propositions, but all save the
first need further testing.
Liability of Community Property
It is elementary that community property is liable for community debts.88 That the community property was acquired in
84. 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942).
85. Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80 (1956) finally resolved the
controversy whether a judgment of separation from bed and board was retroactive by deciding it was not. The decision was legislatively overruled by amendment to art. 155.
86. Community liability seems, more equitable. This alimony is a continuation of the husband's obligation to support his wife. Living expense of the family is a community obligation. Thus as long as community assets are available,
alimony should come from them.
87. Significantly, Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942) classified as separate debts the medical expenses and "personal" expenses of the husband during the pendency of the suit. Cf. Gastauer v. Gastauer, 143 La. 749,
79 So. 326 (1918) (judgment against the husband during pendency of suit for
separation of property is his separate debt because the judgment of separation of
property is retroactive to the date of filing suit).
88. DAGGETT 50. See First Nat'l Bank of Abbeville v. Broussard, 202 La.
315, 11 So. 2d 602 (1942) ; Trahan v. Wilson, 130 La. 541, 58 So. 178 (1912) ;
Paul v. Hoss, 28 La. Ann. 852 (1876) ; Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La.
Ann. 230 (1874) ; Rusk v. Warren, 25 La. Ann. 314 (1873) ; Willard v. Peyton,
24 La. Ann. 342 (1872) ; Dancy v. Martin, Cobb & Co., 23 La. Ann. 323 (1871) ;
Baird v. Lemee, 23 La. Ann. 424 (1871) ; Succession of Kerley, 18 La. Ann. 583
(1866) ; Commissioners of Exchange & Banking Co. v. Bein, 12 Rob. 578 (La.
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the wife's name does not alter the rule. 9 However, if the property is acquired by the wife in such circumstances as to create
an estoppel by deed which precludes the husband from showing
that the property is in truth community property,9 the community creditor cannot proceed directly to seize and sell the
property since the title available to the adjudicatee would not
be marketable.9 1 Instead the creditor must first proceed directly against the wife to have the property judicially declared
to be community property.9 2 Other qualifications to the general
rule are created by special provisions of law which exempt certain property from seizure.9 ' The community, like other debtors, enjoys the benefit of such exemptions.
Liability of the Separate Estates
The community creditor may also hold the husband's separate estate liable for community debts. 4 This doctrine, appar1846) ; Beal v. Ward, 127 So. 423 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930) ; cf. Poindexter v.
Louisiana & A. Ry., 170 La. 521, 128 So. 297 (1930); Oriol v. Herndon, 38
La. Ann. 759 (1886).
89. See, e.g., Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904) ; Cosgrove v.
His Creditors, 41 La. Ann. 274, 6 So. 585 (1889) ; Trezevant v. Holmes, 38 La.
Ann. 146 (1886) ; Desobry v. Schlater, 25 La. Ann. 425 (1873); First Nat'l
Bank of Ville Platte v. Coriel, 145 So. 775 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1933) ; Favrot v.
Paine & Bourgeois, 118 So. 775 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1928). Carlton v. Durr, 120
So. 124, 126 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1928) : "Our attention is called to Act 186 of
1920, which provides that when the community property stands in the name of
the wife, it cannot be sold or mortgaged without the consent of the wife, and
it is argued that property standing in the name of the wife cannot be seized and
sold for the debts of the community, or for the debts of her husband. Community property, under the law and jurisprudence may always be subjected to community debts." See also Theus v. Smith, 189 So. 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939),
cert. denied. Presumably the recent amendment to art. 2334 placing similar restrictions on alienation of property acquired in the joint names of the spouses
will receive a similar interpretation. But cf. Smith v. McCall, 122 So. 149 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1929) (community creditors could not garnish the wife's bank account (community property) in an action against husband and to which wife
was not a party defendant). In some community property states, statutes exempt
the wife's earnings from debts of the husband and thus of the community. See
1 Ds FUNIAK 461. Louisiana has no such statute; art. 2334, in limited cases,
makes the wife's earning her separate property.
90. If the act of sale recites that the wife is purchasing with paraphernal
funds under her administration and that she is purchasing for her separate estate,
there is an estoppel by deed against the husband if he signs the instrument as
a party or as a witness. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964).
91. Neuhauser v. Barthe, 110 La. 825, 34 So. 793 (1903).
92. Ibid. The wife would have the burden of rebutting the presumption that
the property is community property. This ability of the community creditor to
bring such property into the community where the husband could not do so is
the basis for the statement that the estoppel by deed is not applicable to community creditors. See Pfister v. Casso, 161 La. 940, 109 So. 770 (1926) ; Willis
v. Gordon, 94 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. R~v. 3, 17 (1959).
93. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. Xi.
94. See Poindexter v. LMuisiana & A. Ry.. 170 La. 521, 128 So. 297 (1930)
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ently accepted without question in Louisiana, is hard to harmonize with other principles of community property. In the
first place, the doctrine seems to treat the husband as sole and
absolute owner of the community. An equally fundamental ob-

jection is that the doctrine denies the historic notion that husband and wife are partners who share equally the gains and

losses of the common endeavor.95 Equality is denied first because the wife's separate property is ordinarily not liable for
community debts96 and second, even though use of the husband's
separate property gives him a claim to reimbursement from

the community, 97 such claims are so difficult to prove that many
will be lost.9 8 How then did the doctrine become established
over these objections?
It is uncertain how and when the doctrine became crystallized. The husband's control and management of the community
may have led courts to treat him as the owner of it. 99 It was
Gosserand v. Monteleone, 164 La. 397, 113 So. 889 (1927) ; Succession of MeCloskey, 144 La. 438, 80 So. 650 (1919) ; Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176,
51 So. 108 (1910) ; Elizardi v. Kelly, 115 La. 716, 39 So. 851 (1905) ; Succession of Lamm, 40 La. Ann. 312, 4 So. 43 (1888) ; Hawley v. Crescent City Bank,
26 La. Ann. 230 (1874) ; Tucker v. Carlin, 14 La. Ann. 734 (1859) ; Bank of
Montgomery v. Calhoun, 146 So. 51 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933); Succession of
Saux, 2 McGloin 38 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1884).
"Todo deudo que marido, e la
95. FuERO RE.Ai bk. 3, tit. 20, L. 14 (1255)
" LEYES DEL ESTILO, L. 207
muger fici eran en uno, paguenlo otrosi, en uno ..
(1310): "Todo el debdo el marido, et la, muger fizieren en uno, payuenlo otrosi,
en uno. Et es a saber, que el debdo que faze el marido, maguer la muger non lo
otorque, nin sea en la carta del debdo, tenuda es la meytad del debdo." The
thought that debts are shared equally also appears in NUEVA RECOPILACION bk.
5, tit. 9, L. 3 (1557) and NOVISIMA RECOPILACION bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 2 (1805).
Our own Code twice states the principle that debts and losses of the community
are to be shared equally. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2403, 2409 (1870). Matienzo
explains that as the profits of the partnership are shared equally, so must the
debts be shared. MATIENZO 83. Cf. GUTIERREZ, PRACTICARUM QUAESTIONEM
CIRCA LEGES REGIAS HISPANIA (1606), transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAws 258 (1940) [hereinafter cited as GUTIERREZ with page reference to
ROBBINS transl.].
96. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
97. See Denegre v. Denegre, 30 La. Ann. 275 (1878) ; Pennison v. Pennison,
157 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; cf. Maggio v. Papa, 206 La. 38, 18
So. 2d 645 (1944) ; Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23 So. 337 (1897).
98. See Buie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property
in Louisiana, 27 TuL. L. REV. 143 (1953).
99. Prudhomme v. Edens, 6 Rob. 64, 67 (La. 1843): "The husband, being
head and master of the community, all contracts entered into during the marriage must be considered as made by him, and for his advantage, whether they
be made in his own name, or in the names of both the husband and the wife."
This dicta may illustrate a common opinion. However, compare Theall v. Theall,
7 La. 226 (1834) with Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847). There was
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early decided, for example, that the husband's separate creditors
could seize community property to satisfy their claims. 1'0 Second, the failure of the Code to establish a mode for settling the
community on its dissolution led to a series of improvisations.
It was decided that if the husband was the surviving spouse,
he could use community property to pay community debts, 10'
or if he died first, that the community should be settled in his
succession. 11 2 From these practices it would be easy to infer,
that the husband's liability for community debts was such as
to make his separate property liable for them. Third, in the
nineteenth century the husband undoubtedly contracted in his
own name most of the community debts. 108 This invited application of the principle that one who obligates himself personally
binds all his property, present and future. 10 4 Finally, French
law makes the husband's separate estate liable for community
debts.0 5
Although there is dictum stating that the husband's sepFrench doctrine to support the idea that the husband was the owner of the
community. See POTHIER, TRAITA DE LA COMMUNAUTE no 3 (1861 ed.) [hereinafter cited as POTHER] ; 7 TouuLiEz,
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This opinion was shared by some Spanish writers.

o

n'

75-76

(1833).

See the resume in Berdejo,

En Torno a la Naturaleza Juridica de la Communidad de Gananciales del Codigo
Civil, 187 REVISTA GENERAL DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCiA 7, 8-14 (1950).
100. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858). See text accompanying note
179 infra.
101. Succession of Fitzwilliams, 3 La. Ann. 489 (1848). Accord, Maggio v.
Papa, 206 La. 38, 18 So. 2d 645 (1944) ; Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139
So. 901 (1932) ; Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 190, 51 So. 108 (1910) ; Elizardi
v. Kelly, 115 La. 716, 39 So. 851 (1905) ; Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23
So. 337 (1897) ; Succession of Theurer, 38 La. Ann. 510 (1886). Cf. Turner v.
O'Neal, 24 La. Ann. 543 (1872). There is some indication that the surviving
widow may also do so. See Saloy v. Chexnaidre, 14 La. Ann. 567 (1859) ; Succession of Pratt, 12 La. Ann. 457 (1857) ; Cook-Douglas Co. v. Prudhomme, 127
So. 104 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) ;Gaddis Co. v. Litton, 121 So. 334 (La. App.
2d. Cir. 1929).
102. See Succession of Keppel, 113 La. 246, 36 So. 955 (1904); Succession
of Calloway, 49 La. Ann. 968, 22 So. 225 (1897) ; Succession of McLean, 12 La.
Ann. 222 (1857). Apparently the community could not ordinarily be settled in
the wife's succession. See Guillory v. Latour, 138 La. 142, 70 So. 66 (1915) ;
Succession of Fernandez, 50 La. Ann. 564, 23 So. 457 (1898) ; Verrier v. Lorio,
48 La. Ann. 717, 19 So. 677 (1896).
103. The disabilities of married women assured this. Cf. note 99 supra.
104. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3182 (1870): "Whoever binds himself personally,
is obliged to fulfill his engagements out of all his property, movable and immovable, present and future."
105. See 3 PLANIOL nos. 1072-1073. See also Berdejo, En Torno a la Naturaleza Juridica de la Communidad de Gananciales del Codigo Civil, 187 REvIST.
GENERAL DE LEGIBLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA 7, 47-48 (1950) for the similar
position of Spanish law.
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arate estate is liable for community debt as early as 1859,106
the rule appears to have become settled only during the Reconstruction period. 0 7 The court of that period so misunderstood

the fictitious community and the power of the surviving husband
to pay community debts that it allowed him to sell property of

the former community as if the community were still in existence.108 The court reasoned that the surviving head and master
should have the power to sell community property because his

separate property was liable for community debts. 109 Shortly
after the Reconstruction court was replaced, it was settled that
the surviving husband could not convey the interest of the wife's
heirs in the community," 0 but the liability of the husband's
separate estate for community debts lingers on."'
Although the theoretical basis for making the husband's
separate property liable for community debts seems dubious, it
may be sound policy to do so. Practically, it relieves the creditor
106. Tucker v. Carlin, 14 La. Ann. 734 (1859) : "The husband is the head
and master of the community, and is bound for the debts of the community, not
only to the extent of its effects, but to the extent of his separate estate and
entire fortune." Neither explanation of nor authority for such liability is given.
107. See Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874).
108. See ibid.; Phelan v. Ax, 25 La. Ann. 379 (1874). Cf. Glasscock v. Clark,
33 La. Ann. 584 (1881).
109. Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230, 232 (1874): "The
debts of the community during its existence are the debts of the husband. The
property of the community is liable for the payment of them. Even more, the
community property may be taken to pay the debts of the husband contracted
before the marriage. . . . Upon the dissolution of the community by death of the
wife, the responsibility of the husband in regard to the community debts is not
changed. He is absolutely and personally bound for their payment; and his separate property may be seized and sold for their acquittal. This being his position,
he has under his control the community property which by law is expressly subjected to the payment of the community debts; and he has, so far as the final
settlement and liquidation of the community after its dissolution is concerned,
the same rights he had during its existence; because he is, after the dissolution,
under the same responsibilities for the community debts that he was before. It
is but just that he should have these powers." The fallacy in this reasoning is
that LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2409 (1870) makes the husband liable for only half the
debts not acquitted at the dissolution of the community. If he is indeed liable
for the whole of them, it is more than strange that the Code is silent on such
an important matter.
110. Glasscock v. Clark, 33 La. Ann. 584 (1881), overruling Phelan v. Ax,
25 La. Ann. 379 (1873). Accord, Festivan v. Clement, 135 La. 938, 66 So. 304
(1914) ; George v. Delaney, 111 La. 760, 35 So. 894 (1904) ; Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848 (1880); Bennett v. Fuller, 29 La. Ann. 663 (1877);
German v. Gay, 9 La. 580 (1836). Query: What effect does this have on the
power of the surviving husband to use community property to pay community
debts? It is still law that he may do so according to Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La.
123, 139 So. 901 (1932).
111. See Poindexter v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 170 La. 521, 128 So. 297 (1930)
Gosserand v. Monteleone, 164 La. 397, 113 So. 899 (1927) ; Succession of McCloskey, 144 La. 438, 80 So. 650 (1919) ; Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 190, 51
So. 108 (1910) ; Bank of Montgomery v. Calhoun, 146 So. 51 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1933) ; Beal v. Ward, 127 So. 423 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
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extending credit to the community from the inconvenience of
discriminating community assets in the husband's name from
his separate property. More basic is the question whether the
community of gains is a system of limited liability. Limited
liability is not an unthinkable result of a community property
system. The wife's liability for community debts is analogous
to the liability of a partner in commendam,1 12 and in some community property states, the separate property of neither spouse
is liable for community debts. 118 If the liability of the husband's
separate estate is preserved, consideration should be given to
limiting this liability to community debts in fact contracted by
the husband and not extending it to community obligations in14
curred without his consent by the wife."
As a general rule, community creditors may not hold the
wife's separate property liable for community debts during
the existence of the community. 15 The attempts of community
creditors to obtain satisfaction from the wife's paraphernal
property were persistent, acrimonious, and uniformly unsuccessful as long as the disabilities of married women remained
112. Less so today than formerly as the wife may now bind herself for community debts.
113. Arizona: Nelson v. Nelson, 91 Ariz. 215, 370 P.2d 952 (1962) ; Forsythe
v. Paschal, 34 Ariz. 380, 271 Pac. 865 (1921) ; Cosper v. Valley Bank, 28 Ariz.
373, 237 Pac. 175 (1925). Wa8hington: Achilles v. Hooper, 40 Wash. 2d 664,
245 P.2d 1005 (1952) ; Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917)
Stockland v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892).
114. This limitation has been employed in one class of cases. The community
is liable for attorney fees for services rendered the wife in a divorce or separation suit, but the husband's separate property is not liable therefor. See Tanner
v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80 (1956). Community liability for this expense is now preserved by statute, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870), as amended,
which legislatively overruled Tanner on another issue. Tanner is probably still
a correct statement of the liability of the husband's separate property. Of. 3
PLANIOL no. 1340.
115. DAGGETT 53: "The wife's property as we have constantly seen has always been most carefully guarded from attack for the debts of the husband or
by community creditors other than in the exceptional cases already instanced."
Smith v. Viser, 117 So. 2d 673, 674 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) : "It is probable
that there are no principles more elementary, more fundamental, more firmly
imbedded in the law of Louisiana, and more clearly understood, than the principles that the wife is not personally liable for a community debt; that the husband is head and master of the community, and that creditors thereof must obtain
satisfaction of their claims from the husband who is individually liable for community debts, or, in certain instances, by proceeding against the community
property." See Personal Fin., Inc. v. Simms, 148 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962) ; Rouchon v. Rocamora, 84 So. 2d 873 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956) ; Blackshear v. Landey, 46 So. 2d 688 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Ward v. Trimble,
20 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) ; Winter v. Gani, 199 So. 600 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1941) ; First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Brown, 150 So. 86 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1933).
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intact.116 Since 1926, the married women's emancipation stat-

utes have made it possible for a wife to bind herself and her
separate estate for community debts, 1

7

although these statutes

deny any intent to alter community property law."" The courts
have been reluctant to find that the wife bound her separate
estate for a community debt. 1' 9 The judicial requirement that
there be clear and convincing evidence of the wife's intent to
bind her separate property for a community debt probably

means that there must be an instrument in writing.2" Practically the only cases which hold the wife personally liable for a
community debt are those in which she is a co-obligor in solido
with her husband on a promissory note.'21
Solidary liability of the community and the wife's separate

estate was impossible before the married women's emancipation
acts. 22 Indeed, as late as 1923, the court disallowed such solidary liability because of the right of contribution inherent in a
116. See Queyroze v. Capmartin, 40 La. Ann. 262, 4 So. 497 (1888) ; Bartoli
v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887) ; Stuffer v. Puckett, 30 La.
Ann. 811 (1878) ; Storther v. Hamlet, 28 La. Ann. 839 (1876) ; Succession of
Clark, 27 La. Ann. 269 (1875) ; Fluke v. Martin, 26 La. Ann. 279 (1874) ; Abat
v. Atkinson, 21 La. Ann. 239 (1869); Kennedy v. Bossiere, 16 La. Ann. 445
(1862) ; Draughon v. Ryan, 16 La. Ann. 309 (1861) ; Graham v. Egan, 13 La.
Ann. 546 (1858) ; Hill & Co. v. Tippett, 10 La. Ann. 554 (1855) ; Kelly v. Robertson, 10 La. Ann. 303 (1855); Seignouret & Co. v. Gardanne, 9 La. Ann. 4
(1854) ; Hanna v. Pritchard, 6 La. Ann. 730 (1851) ; Hellwig v. West, 2 La.
Ann. 1 (1847) ; Davidson v. Stuart, 10 La. 146 (1836). For the few exceptions
under the old law, see DAGGETT 50-53.

117. LA. R.S. 9:103 (1950) : "Married women may obligate themselves personally in any form, or dispose of or hypothecate their property, as security or
otherwise, for the benefit of their husbands or of the community between them
and their husbands."
118. Id. 9:105: "Nothing contained in R.S. 9:101, 9:102, and 9:103 is intended to modify or affect the laws relating to the matrimonial community of
acquets and gains or the laws prescribing what is deemed the separate property
of the spouses."
119. See, e.g., O'Dowd v. McNeill, 110 So. 2d 755 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959)
Rouchon v. Rocamora, 84 So. 2d 873 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956); Fairbanks,
Morse & Co. v. Bordelon, 198 So. 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1.940) ; Wilson & Gandy
v. Cummings, 150 So. 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933). Whether the wife has bound
herself for a community debt is a problem to be distinguished from the problem
of whether the wife's contract creates a separate or community debt.
120. Wilson & Gandy v. Cummings, 150 So. 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933)
says that the wife's liability cannot be proved by parol because it is a promise
to pay the debt of a third person, required to be in writing by LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 2278(3) (1870).
121. United Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Haley, 178 La. 63, 150 So. 833
(1933) ; Howard v. Cardella, 171 La. 921, 132 So. 501 (1931) ; Friendly Loans,
Inc. v. Morris, 142 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Perdido Fin. Co. V.
Falgout, 77 So. 2d 896 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) ; cf. Brock Furniture Co. v.
Carroll, 86 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956)
Accounts Supervision Co. V.
Mathews, 50 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) Holahan v. Misuraca, 112 F.
Supp. 504 (E.D. La. 1953).
122. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2398 (1870) : "The wife, whether separated in prop-

erty or by judgment, or not separated, can not bind herself for her husband, nor
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solidary obligation. 123 Solidary liability is now possible, 1 24 but
thus far the question of contribution has not been resolved.
Shropshire v. His Creditors125 held that where husband and wife
are solidary obligors and she pays the debt, on dissolution of the
community she is subrogated to the rights of the creditor paid
in order to force contribution from the co-obligor. 126 This seems
a just result in accord with general principles of reimbursement. 12 7 Suppose, however, husband and wife are solidary obligors on a note which represents a community debt, and the
community pays the debt. Can the community demand contribution from the wife's separate estate? Or may her share of
the debt be compensated against her portion of the community
on dissolution? In this situation it seems fair to deny contribution by treating the wife as a surety.2 s Otherwise the wife's
portion of the community could be reduced to zero if enough
solidary obligations were contracted and discharged by the community. Regardless of the problems of adjusting the rights of
the community and the wife's separate estate, such solidary
obligations confer two advantages on the community creditor
who obtains them. Such creditor obtains additional security,
and a procedural convenience if the community is dissolved by
the husband's death. In that event, he may proceed directly
against the wife for the whole debt without presenting a claim
1 29
against the succession.
conjointly with him, for debts contracted by him before or during the marriage."
See Millaudon v. Carson, 25 La. Ann. 380 (1873) ;Trudeau v. Row, 23 La. Ann.

197 (1871) ; Dancy v. Martin, Cobb & Co., 23 La. Ann. 323 (1871) ; Wiley v.
Hunter, 2 La. Ann. 806 (1847). The article was in effect repealed by the later
married women's emancipation acts. See LA. R.S. 9:103 (1950).
123. Honeycutt v. Whitten, 152 La. 1045, 1048, 95 So. 216, 217 (1923)
"Article 2398, C.C., in plain terms says that the wife cannot bind herself conjointly with the husband. The reason for this rule is that under the equitable
doctrine of contribution among joint and solidary obligors a legal situation would
arise in which one of the spouses might, as a result of such conventional agreemerit, acquire a claim against the other in contravention of the laws limiting the
right and authority of husband and wife to enter into such contracts." See also
Ring v. Schilkoffsky, 158 La. 361, 104 So. 115 (1925), denying solidary liability
124. Howard v. Cardella, 171 La. 921, 132 So. 501 (1931) decided that Act
132 of 1926 and Act 233 of 1.928 made solidary liability possible.
125. 15 La. Ann. 705 (1860).
126. Ibid. The court did not explain how husband and wife could legally
bind themselves as solidary obligors.
127. Cf. Denbgre v. Denbgre, 30 La. Ann. 275 (1878).
128. It is elementary that if the principal debtor pays the debt he is not
entitled to contribution from his surety who bound himself in solido with the
principal debtor. See Union Nat'l Bank v. Legendre, 35 La. Ann. 787 (1883).
French law treats the wife as a surety, as between husband and wife, when she
is bound in solido with him. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1431 (1804); 3
PLANIOL 1094.
129. See Succession of Mathews, 158 So. 233 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) ; cf.
Friendly Loans Inc. v. Morris, 142 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). Like-
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The general rule that the wife is not personally liable for

community debts remains true after dissolution of the community. 13 The wife may renounce the community,13 1 or accept
with benefit of inventory, 32 and be relieved from personal liability for community debts. The origin of the wife's power to
renounce the community and be relieved of liability for community debts is lost in the obscurity of medieval legal history.3
A plausible explanation is that the privilege developed as a
counterpart to the husband's absolute control of community affairs which gave him unlimited power to create debts, and the
legal doctrine which made the surviving wife liable for a share
of community debts :134 renunciation offered an effective if costly device by which the widow could escape the result of her husband's improvidence and mismanagement. An integral part of
French and Spanish law, 8 5 the wife's privilege to renounce the

community on its dissolution, was codified in the first Louisiana Civil Code, 8l 6 and has remained in our law notwithstanding

the significant increase in the power of the wife to obligate the
community,8 7 the decision that the wife owns a moiety of the
community during every moment of its existence, 138 and legiswise, the wife's liability would seem to remain even if she renounced the community.
130. See Schreiber v. Beer's Widow & Heirs, 150 La. 676, 91 So. 149 (1922).
Although the widow is presumed to accept the community, she may renounce
until she has accepted in fact.
131. LA CIVIL CODE art. 2410 (1870): "Both the wife and her heirs or
assigns have the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves from the debts
contracted during the marriage, by renouncing the partnership or community of
gains." See also id. arts. 2412, 2418.
132. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) : "At the dissolution for any cause of the marriage community, the wife may accept the community of acquets and gains under
the benefit of inventory, in the same manner and with the same benefits and
advantages as are allowed heirs to accept a succession under the benefit of inventory."
133. POTHiER n* 92 relates that the privelege was first extended to noble
ladies at the time of the Crusades in order that they might not be crushed by
the extravagant debts of their husbands incurred in such expeditions. 3 PLANIOL
no. 1218 dismisses this as fanciful and suggests that the privilege is a vestige
from an earlier era in which the wife's interest in the community was a right
of succession.
134. See DIDIER, L'OPTION DE LA FEMME COMMUN EN BEINS 11-22 (1957);
De los Mozos, La Renuncia a la Sociedad Legal de Gananciales, 13 ANUARIO DE
DEREcHo CIVIL 63, 131-37 (1960); Cf. BRISSAUD, HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE
LAW no. 566 (Howell transl. 1912). Significantly, ancient opinion in France
and Spain considered the husband the sole proprietor of the community. See
note 99 supra. He could not renounce the community -nor
can he in Louisiana.
Succession of Baum, 11 Rob. 314 (La. 1845).
135. French: FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1453 (1804); 3 PLANIOL nos. 12171220; POTHiER n- 92-95. Spanish: LEYES DE TORO, L. 60 (1505); ACEVEDO
192-97; GuTIFERREz 256-57; 2 LLAMAS Y MOLINA 311-14; MATIENZO 123-27.
136. La. Civil Code p. 338, art. 72 (1808).
137. See text accompanying note 203 infra.
138. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926). The wife's power
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lation authorizing the wife to accept the community with benefit of inventory.'3 9 Thus it is still law that until she makes herself liable by acts equivalent to acceptance, the widow is not
liable for community debts. 40 She may make herself liable by
4
taking "an active concern in the effects" of the community.1 '
"Active concern" must not be misunderstood: it is not participation in community affairs which fixes her liability; rather

it is failure to have an inventory made 4 2 and her intermeddling
with community assets after the husband's death which operates as a tacit acceptance of the community. 143 Likewise, the
widow may not renounce if she has concealed or fraudulently
disposed of community assets. 144 In either case she is liable for
one half of the community debts.1 45 Indeed, it appears that the
only case in which the wife can be made liable for more than
half of a community debt on dissolution of the community is
when she is a solidary co-obligor on a note representing a com-

munity debt.

46

Whether in this situation other creditors could

proceed against the wife for half of their debt on the theory
to renounce is hard to reconcile with this decision. Perhaps the matter is best
rationalized by considering the wife's power to renounce as a protective device
awarded her in return for the husband's extensive power to manage the community. How this decision affects the ultimate disposition of the wife's share
of the community if she renounces it has not been decided. Previously it was
held that her share of the community goes to the husband. See Jacob v. Falgoust,
150 La. 21, 90 So. 426 (1922); Ferrand v. Heirs of Bres, 35 La. Ann. 908
(1883) ; Fabre v. Hepp, 7 La. Ann. 5 (1852). These cases, however, relied on
the theory that the wife had only an inchoate interest in the community.
139. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) derived from La. Acts 1882, No. 4.
140. See Shreiber v. Beer's Widow & Heirs, 150 La. 676, 91 So. 149 (1922)
Reihl v. Martin, 29 La. Ann. 15 (1877); Ludeling v. Felton, 28 La. Ann. 849
(1876) ; Cockburn v. Wilson, 20 La. Ann. 39 (1868).
141. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2412 (1870). See Martin Davie & Co. v. Carville,
110 La. 862, 34 So. 807 (1903) ; Collins v. Babin, 16 La. Ann. 290 (1861);
Saloy v. Chexnaidre, 14 La. Ann. 567 (1859) ; Scott v. Rusk, 2 La. Ann. 266
(1847) ; Armato v. Ross, 177 So. 491 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
142. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2413 (1870). Cf. Chapman v. Kimball, 6 Rob.
94 (La. 1843).
143. See cases cited in note 141 supra. See also Lauderdale v. Gardner, 8
Mart.(O.S.) 716 (La. 1820).
144. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2418 (1870). See Bonner v. Gill, 5 La. Ann. 629
(1850) ; Lynch v. Benton, 12 Rob. 113 (La. 1845).
145. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2409 (1870). See cases cited in notes 141, 144
supra. See also Morris v. Covington, 2 La. Ann. 259 (1847) ; Succession of
Plauche, 2 La. Ann. 575 (1847) ; cf. Jeaudron v. Boudreaux, 1 Rob. 383 (La.
1842) (the widow who accepts is liable for no specific debt but for one-half of
the total owed).
146. See Friendly Loans Inc. v. Morris, 142 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962) ; Succession of Mathews, 158 So. 233 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935). One
other possible exception arises when the wife and the community are judgment
debtors in solido for the wife's tort. See, e.g., Vail v. Spampinato, 238 La. 259,
115 So. 2d 343 (1959). If the community is dissolved before the judgment is
satisfied, it seems the judgment creditor could hold the wife liable for the whole
debt.
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that she had lost the power to renounce the community by tak14 7
ing an active concern in its effects has not yet been decided.
Priority of Community Creditors
On dissolution of the community its creditors enjoy a priority. In the first place, after death of the wife a community
creditor having a judgment may proceed directly against the
surviving husband and seize and sell community property to
satisfy a community debt. 148 Washington v. Palmer 49 allows
the judgment creditor of the community the same right after
dissolution of the community by divorce. Second, community
creditors enjoy a priority over the separate creditors of the
spouses, 1" ° even if the separate creditor is a secured creditor, 151
as to community property. It appears that the priority of the
community creditor precludes the separate creditors from seizing and selling the undivided interest of the debtor-spouse in
the unliquidated community. 152 There is some indication that
if the husband is a community creditor, he enjoys the priority
147. Query: Could the wife under these circumstances accept the community
with benefit of inventory? Can any wife who has taken an active concern in
the affairs of the community accept with benefit of inventory?
148. See Harman & Stringfellow v. Legrande, 151 La. 253, 91 So. 726 (1922)
Simpson v. Bulkley, 140 La. 589, 73 So. 691 (1917); Luria v. Cote Blanche
Co., 114 La. 385, 38 So. 279 (1905) ; Succession of Hooke, 46 La. Ann. 353,
15 So. 150 (1894); Succession of Cason, 32 La. Ann. 790 (1880) ; Paul v.
Hoss, 28 La. Ann. 852 (1876); Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann.
230 (1874); Ricker v. Pearson, 26 La. Ann. 391 (1874) ; Baird v. Lemee, 23
La. Ann. 424 (1871); Succession of Saux, 2 McGloin 38 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1884). So also a mortgagee may secure executory process on a mortgage securing
a community debt, by proceeding against the surviving spouse, whether husband
or wife. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2671 (1960) ; Landry v. Grace,
167 La. 1042, 120 So. 770 (1929) ; Twomey v. Papalia, 142 La. 621, 77 So. 479
(1917) ; Schlieder v. Boulet, 124 La. 658, 50 So. 617 (1909); Landreaux v.
Louque, 43 La. Ann. 234, 9 So. 32 (1891).
149. 213 La. 79, 34 So. 2d 382 (1948).
150. Zeigler v. His Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 144, 174, 21 So. 666, 678 (1896)
"It has been repeatedly held that community creditors are entitled to a priority
on community property over the separate creditors of the spouses. This preference is secured neither by a privilege nor a mortgage, technically, but is the
result of the tenure or character of the interest of the spouse in the property.
It is analogous to the right to the preference of the partnership creditors over
the creditors of the individual partners."
See Succession of Keppel, 113 La.
246, 36 So. 955 (1904) ; Thompson v. Vance, 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903) ;
Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23 So. 337 (1897) ; Healey v. Ashbey, 47 La.
Ann. 636, 17 So. 195 (1895) ; Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481
(1894) ; Rawlins v. Giddens, 46 La. Ann. 1136, 15 So. 501 (1894) ; Webre v.
Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 7 So. 460 (1890) ; Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied. But cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 235 La. 226,
103 So.2d 263 (1958).
151. See Healey v. Ashbey, 47 La. Ann. 636, 17 So. 195 (1895) ; Newman
v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894). But see Alter v. O'Brien, 31
La. Ann. 452 (1879) (creditor for wife's funeral expenses (a separate debt)
was given priority by his privilege over mortgagee of community property).
152. See Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23 So. 337 (1897). But see
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of community creditors as against separate creditors, but that
his claim is junior to those of other community creditors. 153 If
so, logically the same rule should apply when the wife is a community creditor. 1 4 Otherwise, community creditors participate
concurrently, or according to any preference a privilege or
mortgage may entitle them, as the case may be. 155
The priority of the community creditor is superior to any
claim of ownership. on the community property by the surviving spouse or the heirs of the deceased spouse. 156 The question
has frequently been litigated in regard to the priority of the
community creditor over the wife's interest in the community.
The wife's interest was repeatedly characterized as "residu5
ary" 57 prior to the decision in Phillips v. Phillips-'
8 that the
Webre v. Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 180, 7 So. 460 (1890) : "There is nothing in
the jurisprudence of this state, in the Code, or the decisions of this court, to
prevent the surviving spouse from disposing of his or her part of the community property subject to the debts and charges of the community. Therefore
the individual creditors of either can subject it by seizure and sale to the payment of his debt, subject of course to the debts of the community." Such remedy
is comfortless as the property so burdened is unmarketable. The separate creditor's remedy, as indicated by Pior v. Giddens, is first to provoke a liquidation
of the community.
153. See Succession of Merrick, 35 La. Ann. 296 (1883).
154. Cf. Succession of Dejean, 5 La. Ann. 593 (1850). However, restitution
to the wife has always been favored by the courts, and she may be permitted to
participate equally with other community creditors.
155. See Norman Mayer & Co. v. Montgomery, 187 La. 374, 174 So. 880
(1937) ; Succession of Broussard, 142 La. 99, 76 So. 253 (1917).
156: Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 617, 50 So. 2d 208, 212 (1950) : "But
neither the spouses nor the heirs have anything to claim out of the acquets and
gains 'until all debts are paid or liquidated.'" Accord, Tomme v. Tomme, 174
La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932) ; Harmon & Stringfellow v. Legrande, 151 La. 253,
91 So. 726 (1922) ; Latour v. Latour, 134 La. 342, 64 So. 133 (1914) ; Kelly
v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913) ; Succession of Landry, 128 La. 333,
54 So. 870 (1911) ; Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 175, 51 So. 108 (1910);
Succession of Emonot, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902) ; Childs v. Lockett, 107
La. 270, 31 So. 751 (1902); Messick v. Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161, 27 So. 815
(1900) ; Succession of Fernandez, 50 La. Ann. 564, 23 So. 457 (1898) ; Berthelot
v. Fitch, 45 La. Ann. 389, 12 So. 625 (1893) ; Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La.
Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887); Dickson v. Dickson, 36 La. Ann. 453 (1884).;
Durham v. Williams, 32 La. Ann. 968 (1880) ; Cestac v. Florane, 31 La. Ann.
493 (1879) ; Riley v. Condran, 26 La. Ann. 294 (1874) ; Ricker v. Pearson,
26 La. Ann. 391 (1874) ; Phelan v. Ax, 25 La. Ann. 379 (1873) ; Sadler v.
Kimbrough, 24 La. Ann. 534 (1872) ; Baird v. Lemee, 23 La. Ann. 424 (1871) ;
Ware v. Jones, 19 La. Ann. 428 (1867) ; Succession of Kerley, 18 La. Ann. 583
(1866) ; Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847) ; Succession of Ogden, 10 Rob.
457 (La. 1845) ; Succession of Thomas, 12 Rob. 215 (1845); Hart v. Foley,
1 Rob. 378 (La. 1842) ; Lawson v. Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841) ; German v. Gay,
9 La. 580 (1836) ; Succession of Lewis, 12 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
157. See, e.g., Harmon & Stringfellow v. Legrande, 151 La. 253, 91 So. 726
(1922) ; Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 175, 51 So. 108 (1910) ; Messick v.
Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161, 27 So. 815 (1900) ; Succession of Fernandez, 50 La.
Ann. 564, 23 So. 457 (1898) ; Berthelot v. Fitch, 45 La. Ann. 389, 12 So. 625
(1893) ; Dickson v. Dickson, 36 La. Ann. 453 (1884) ; Ware v. Jones, 19 La.
Ann. 428 (1867) ; Succession of Kerley, 18 La. Ann. 583 (1866).
158. 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
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wife was an "owner" of an interest in the community at every

moment of its existence. The two concepts are not incompatible,
for designating the wife's interest as "residuary" merely restates the proposition that the wife's claim to one-half of the
community is subordinate to the claims of community creditors. 1 9 That the wife's claim is residuary in this sense is easily
demonstrated. If the wife accepts the community, she is liable
for half of its debts.' 0 More fundamentally, the wife's claim is

one-half the community of gains, and the existence of gains cannot be determined until the debts and losses are paid. 161 Thus
the wife is an owner, but her ownership is analogous to that of
62
a partner, subject to divestment by partnership creditors.
The interest of the husband is precisely the same in this re168
spect.
Community Debts Follow Community Property
The priority of the community creditor over claims of ownership by either spouse, on dissolution of the community, becomes important if the surviving spouse conveys his or her in-

terest in the community property before community debts are
paid. In these circumstances, community debts may follow community property, rendering it liable for the payment of these
159. Cf. Ware v. Jones, 19 La. Ann. 428, 430 (1867): "The land, being
community property, one half of it belongs to the widow, and the other to the
heirs. The title so vested continues in the parties, subject to be divested at any
time by the creditors themselves, or by the administrator acting for them. When
it is said that the rights of the heirs are merely residuary, nothing more is meant
than they take only what remains of a succession after its charges are paid.
They are not the less owners of the property they inherit, because it is followed
by and subject to the charges against it." Accord, Dickson v. Dickson, 36 La.
Ann. 453 (1884).
160. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2409 (1870).
161. See Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913) ; Depas v. Riez, 2
La. Ann. 30 (1847) ; Hart v. Foley, 1 Rob. 378 (La. 1842) ; Lawson v. Ripley,
17 La. 238 (1841). Cf. 9 MANRESA 601: "S610 puede considerarse como ganancia
verdadera, partible entre lo8 c6nyuges a la disoluci6n dcl matrimonio, la differencia entre el activo y el pasivo; si no hay sobrante, no hay ganancias."
162. See Mourain v. Delamarre, 2 La. Ann. 142 (1847) ; Akin v. Oakey, 10
Rob. 410 (La. 1845) ; Tyler v. His Creditors, 9 Rob. 372 (La. 1844) ; Claiborne v. His Creditors, 13 La. 279 (1839) ; Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart.(O.S.)
331 (La. 1822). But see Berdejo, En Torno a la Naturaleza Juridica de la
Comunidad de Gananciales del Codigo Civil, 187 REVISTA GENERAL DE LEoIsLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA 7 (1950) ; De los Mozos, La Renuncia a la Sociedad
Legal de Gananciales, 13 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 63, 106-22 (1960), both
critical of views which consider the matrimonial community as a form of partnership.
163. See Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 50 So. 2d 208 (1950) ; Tomme v.
Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932) ; Succession of Landry, 128 La. 333,
54 So. 870 (1911) ; Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887);
Succession of Lewis, 12 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
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debts in the hands of a third person. 1 64 Thompson v. Vance' 65
is the leading case. After dissolution of the community, the surviving husband, Zeigler, conveyed his interest in immovable
community property to Vance, who mortgaged it to Thompson.
When Thompson foreclosed, the Zeigler children intervened, asserting that their mother's claim against the community for
restitution of paraphernalia descended to them by heirship, and
had now been judicially fixed in amount, thus entitled them to
the priority of a community creditor. The court sustained the
intervention and ordered that they be paid in preference to the
mortgagee. 160 Since Zeigler had only a defeasible title, reasoned
the court, his vendee acquired only a defeasible title.167 It was
specifically decided that claims of community creditors need not
be recorded in order to affect community property in the hands
16 8
of a third person.
That the principle that community debts follow immovable
community property without recordation survived the subsequently developed public records doctrine 69 is doubtful. Hum164. See Thompson v. Vance, 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903) ; Zeigler v. His

Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 144, 21 So. 666 (1898); Succession of Giddens, 48 La.
Ann. 356, 19 So. 125 (1896) ; Webre v. Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 7 So. 460
(1890) ; Ealer v. Lodge, 36 La. Ann. 115 (1884) ; Durham v. Williams, 32 La.
Ann. 968 (1880) ; Moore v. Blount, 160 So. 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) ; Elmer
v. Prescott, 1 Orl. App. 103 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1904).
165. 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903).
166. Id. at 42, 34 So. at 119.
167. Id. at 32-33, 34 So. at 115: "Upon the dissolution of the community by
the death of Mrs. Zeigler, the surviving spouse became seized of the undivided
one-fourth of the property, and the title so vested continued in him, subject,
however, to be divested at any time by the community creditors. This right of
ownership being subordinated to the paramount claims of the community creditors,
the rights of an alienee of the surviving spouse necessarily became subordinated
to the rights of the community creditors.
"When, therefore, Vance purchased Zeigler's interest in the property, he
acquired no greater rights than the latter had, which was simply the residuum,
and when he mortgaged it to Thompson, the latter took the mortgage cum onere,
and can enforce it only to the extent of his mortgagor's interest.
"These consequences result from a long line of decisions which have rockbedded in the jurisprudence of this state the principle that community creditors
are entitled to a priority on community property over separate creditors of the
spouses; that no act of the surviving spouse, in his own name or as tutor, and
no act of the heirs, whether of age or not, can deprive the creditor of this right;
that the rights of community creditors are paramount to the right of ownership
which the surviving spouse acquired in the property at the dissolution of the
community; and that hence, no creditor of the spouses can acquire any right
upon the property except being subordinated to the payment of community debts."
168. Id. at 36, 34 So. at 117: "So long as the community is not liquidated
or settled, the children have a claim upon community property for the debts due
them by the community, a protection really higher and greater than througl
either mortgage or privilege. It springs, as we have said, from the tenure itself
under which the property is held." See also id. at 40-41, 34 So. at 118.
169. McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910) is usually cited
as the fountainhead of the public records doctrine.
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phreys v. Royal170 shows that after divorce, the former husband
may convey good title to the community immovables, provided
the former wife has not recorded the divorce judgment in the
conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is
situated.' 7 ' On this basis, Speights v. Nance1 72 held that a divorced wife could not enforce her unrecorded claims as a community creditor against the husband's undivided interest in immovable property which he had conveyed to a third person.178
The difficulty with the decision is that a community creditor
may have no instrument which the law of registry requires to
be recorded. 1 74 The claim of the community creditor becomes
a burden on the community property which will follow it into
the hands of a third person only on dissolution of the community. At that time what instrument does the community creditor have which he can record? Thompson v. Vance has never
been overruled,'175 but Speights indicates that the creditor must
now record his claims, at least if the community is dissolved by
a judgment of divorce. There is not, as yet, any indication
whether the creditor must now do so if the community is dis1 76
solved by death of one spouse.
Rights of Separate Creditors
Creditors of the Husband
The husband's separate creditors enjoy several advantages
enjoyed by community creditors. Since the husband is personally liable for his separate debts, his separate estate is liable
for these debts as a matter of course.1 77 That the wife's separ170. 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949).
171. Ibid. The ex-wife had no claim of ownership to the property as against
the ex-husband's vendee.
172. 142 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
173. Ibid. The opinion is unclear whether it was necessary for the wife to
record the judgment of divorce in the conveyance records, or whether she had
to record her claim as a community creditor. None of the cases allowing community debts to follow community property were mentioned or discussed.
174. See LA CIVIL CODE art. 2266 (1870) : "All

sales, contracts and judg-

ments affecting immovable property, which shall not be so recorded, shall be
utterly null and void, except between the parties thereto." See also LA. R.S.
9:2721 (1950).
175. The decision was considered controlling and followed in Moore v. Blount,
160 So. 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
176. It is still law, apparently, that the public records doctrine will not defeat the rights of the deceased's heirs to half the community property. See Long
v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937) ; Succession of James, 147 La. 944,
86 So. 403 (1920) ; George v. Delaney, 111 La. 760, 35 So. 894 (1904). But cf.
Chachere v. Superior Oil Co., 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939).
177. See LA: CIVIL CODE art. 3182 (1870).
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ate property is not liable for such debts is equally elementary. 7 8
The husband's separate creditors have been allowed, however,

to subject community property to their debts.

79

Even the hus-

band's prenuptial creditors have been allowed to do so, although

article 2403 expressly forbids it.'5 0 Apparently this has been
allowed on the theory that since the husband, as head and mas-

ter of the community, could voluntarily use community assets
to pay his separate debts, his separate creditors should be able
to compel him to do so.""
Community liability for the husband's prenuptial debts has
been severely criticized as treating the husband as sole owner
of the community.1 2 Upon the decision that the wife owns a
half interest in the community during every moment of its existence, 183 the ability of the husband's separate creditors to hold
178. DAGGETT 53. However, since 1926 it has been possible for the wife to
become surety for her husband's debts. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
179. See Hawley v. Cresecent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874) ; Davis v.
Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858) ; Succession of Curtis, 10 La. Ann. 662
(1855) ; Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848) ; Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann.
226 (1847) ; Stafford v. Sumrall, 21 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Crigler, 12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied; First Nat'l Bank of Ville Platte v. Coreil, 145 So. 395 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1933) ; Favrot v. Paine & Bourgeois, 18 So. 775 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1925) ;
of. Succession of Schwenck, 43 La. Ann. 1110, 10 So. 185 (1891) ; Heirs of Gee
v. Thompson, 41 La. Ann. 348, 6 So. 548 (1889) ; Belair v. Dominguez, 26 La.
Ann. 605 (1874).
180. See Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874) ; Davis v.
Compton, 13 La. Ann. 316 (1858); Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848);
Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847) ; Stafford v. Sumrall, 21 So. 2d 396
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
181. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858): "Art. 2372 C.C. [2403]
declares that 'the debts of both husband and wife anterior to the marriage must
be acquitted out of their own personal and individual effects.' This Article must
be interpreted in connection with Article 2373 [2404] of the same Code, which
pronounces the husband to be the head and master of the partnership or community of gains and permits him to administer its effects, dispose of the revenues
which they produce and alienate them, by an encumbered title, without the consent and permission of his wife. Article 2372 [2403] entitles either the wife or
husband, when debts of either originating before the marriage have been paid
out of the community, to be reimbursed the amount so paid at the dissolution and
settlement of the community.

As the husband has the right to alienate the ef-

fects of the community without the consent of his wife, creditors of the husband
before marriage ought also to have the right to seize the effects of the community
to satisfy their claims."
182. 1 DE 1F'UNIAK 438-39. Early Spanish law denied community liability
for prenuptial debts of either spouse. See FuEO REAL bk. 3, tit. 20, L. 14
(1255) ; LEYES DE EST[Lo L. 207 (1310) ; cf. 1 Asso Y MANUEL 95-96; AZEVEDO
196. French law, on the contrary, makes the community liable for prenuptial
debts of both spouses. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1409 (1804). The divergence
is probably due to the difference between the French and Spanish community.
The Spanish community has always been a community of acquets and gains;
the French legal community is a community of movables and gains into which
the movables owned by each spouse at the time of marriage enter the community
as its original capital.

See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1401

(1804).

183. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
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the community liable for their claims became ripe for reap4
praisal. The tentative reappraisal in Fazzio v. KriegerM
suggests that the separate creditor may no longer obtain satisfaction from the community. In Fazzio, the husband was unemployed, but his second wife was employed. The first wife sued
for child support. The court held that the husband's half of his
second wife's income was properly taken into consideration in
fixing the amount of alimony because such alimony is not a debt
within the meaning of article 2403.185 In dictum, the court states
that the earlier cases allowing the husband's separate creditors
to make community property liable for their claims "would still
be authority for the proposition that the husband's half interest
in the community is liable for his debts contracted before marriage, subject, of course, to community debts. ' 186 Does the court
mean that the husband's prenuptial creditor must wait until the
community is dissolved and proceed against the husband's half
interest in the residuum after community debts are paid? Or
does it mean that the separate creditor may seize one-half the
community at any time? Or that the separate creditor may seize
and sell, during the existence of the community, the husband's
undivided half interest in it?
Each alternative presents grave inconveniences. If the husband's separate creditors must postpone enforcement of their
claims until the community is dissolved and liquidated, marriage becomes a way of avoiding prenuptial debts indefinitely.18 7
184. 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
185. Id. at 522, 76 So. 2d at 716: "[W]e are of the opinion that the obligation of the defendant in the instant case is an obligation imposed by law and is
clearly not a debt within the meaning of Article 2403 of the Civil Code, and that
therefore the trial judge was correct in considering the husband's half of the
income of the second community in fixing the amount awarded for the maintenance and suuport of his children by a former marriage." The court's reasoning
that the obligation was not a debt is not convincing. That the obligation to
support the legitimate children of a spouse by a former marriage is a separate
debt is at least a debatable proposition. Current Spanish law makes this a
community obligation. SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1408 (1889). Arizona holds
that alimony to a former wife is an obligation of the second community. Gardner
v. Gardner, 95 Ariz. 202, 388 P.2d 417 (1964).
186. Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 524, 76 So. 2d 713, 717 (1954).
187. De Funiak argues that people do not marry to accomplish this. 1 DE
FUNIAK 440-41. Nevertheless if such is the result of marriage, inevitably some
people will take advantage of it, regardless of the reason for which they married,
as the experience of Washington shows. Mecham, Creditor's Rights in Community
P roperty, 11 WAsH. L. REv. 80, 87 (1936) : "The first class has been an easy
one for our courts. It consists of those instances in which a creditor attempts to
enforce a prenuptial debt against community property -usually
the husband's
salary or earnings -and
discovers to his sorrow that by committing matrimony,
the debtor has placed his earnings beyond the reach of that debt. Inquiry directed
to the credit managers of several retail business houses disclosed that this situa-
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Further, the law of prescription would require some adjustment to prevent loss of such creditor's claims during the existence of the community. The eventual right against the husband's share of the community, if there be any residuum after
community debts are paid, seems small comfort to the creditor
who must wait an indefinite period before he can enforce it. If
the husband's separate creditor may seize half of the community assets at any time, then the separate creditor has power to
partition the community. 88 If the creditor seizes and sells half
the community assets, does the community continue? If so, what
are its assets? Under the reasoning in Faczzio, all that would
remain would be the wife's share of the community. How there
could be a later partition between husband and wife in conformity with article 2406189 is unclear. On the other hand, if the
seizure operates as a dissolution of the community, the creditor
has power to dissolve the community in circumstances in which
the spouses could not do so. Finally, if the creditor is able to
seize the husband's undivided interest during the existence of
the community, one of two results seems to follow. Either the
community is no longer between husband and wife but between
wife and stranger, or the community is effectively dissolved.
These inconveniences suggest that the earlier decisions allowing the husband's separate creditor to subject community
assets to his claim may have been a concession to practicality
which creates fewer inconveniences than the available alternatives. Iao The community receives the income of the husband's
tion is one of more frequent occurrence than might be supposed. There seems to
be no 'out' for the creditor in this case short of refusing to deal on an open
account basis with unmarried persons, and that is an impossible alternative."
Cf. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 284 (1962).
188. The modes of dissolving the community are established by law. See
Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 241 (1964). None of these heretofore have depended
upon the will of husband's separate creditors. Significantly also, the action for
separation of property is not even available to the husband. Hotard v. Hotard,
12 La. Ann. 145 (1857).
189. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2406 (1870) : "The effects which compose the partnership or community of gains are divided into two equal portions between the
husband and the wife, or between their heirs, at the dissolution of the marriage;
and it is the same with respect to the profits arising from the effects which
both husband and wife brought reciprocally in marriage, and which have been
administered by the husband, or by husband and wife conjointly, although what
has been thus brought in marriage, by either the husband or the wife, be more
considerable that what has been brought by the other, or even although one of
the two did not bring anything at all."
190. Significantly, Spanish law now allows the prenuptial obligations of husband and wife to be enforced against community property if the debtor spouse
has insufficient separate property to satisfy them. See SPANISH CIVIL CODE art.
1410 (1889). As previously noticed, the community is liable for such debts in
French law. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1409 (1804).
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separate estate and that of his labor. Thus he has no separate
income with which to pay his prenuptial debts and can pay them
only by selling separate property (thus reducing the income
available to the community) or by using community funds. The
community suffers diminution in either event. Allowing the
separate creditor to seize, but giving the community a right to
reimbursement against the husband's separate estate is a fair
solution. 19' If that solution is now impossible due to article
2403, then the separate creditor's enforcement of his claim
should be postponed until dissolution of the community. For all
its inconveniences, this appears to be the position of the wife's
prenuptial creditors, 92 and it is the position of the husband's
separate creditors generally in Arizona and Washington.' 9"
The creditor who deals with the husband during the marriage should not be obliged to determine at his peril whether
the husband is acting as the legal representative of the community or is acting in his individual capacity. Since the husband
is normally the legal representative of the community, every
debt he incurs during marriage is presumed to be a community
debt. 1 94 Nevertheless, some debts incurred by the husband during marriage are separate debts, as when he acquires separate
property under an onerous title. Formerly such separate creditors could hold the community liable for their claims. 195 After
Fazzio, it is unclear what rights against the community such
creditors have. Although their rights are likely to be the same
as those granted to the husband's prenuptial creditors, they may
be entitled to greater rights since their claims stem from debts
incurred during the marriage.
On dissolution of the community, the rights of the husband's
separate creditors seem settled. They may subject to their
claims the debtor's share of the community, but such share cannot be determined until community debts are paid. 9 Neces191. The right to reimbursement is well settled.

See Jefferson v. Stringfellow,

148 La. 223, 86 So. 744 (1920) ; Harris v. Harris, 160 So. 2d 359 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
192. See Walters v. Wilson, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 135 (La. 1824) ; Flogny v. Hatch,
.12 Mart.(O.S.) 82 (La. 1822); Keyser v. James, 153 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963).
193. See cases cited in note 113 supra.
194. See Draughon v. Ryan, 16 La. Ann. 309 (1861). See also DAGGETT
50; Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 35
.(1959). Of. 9 MANRESA 609.
195. See Succession of Curtis, 10 La. Ann. 662 (1855) ; First Nat'l Bank
of' 196.
ille Thus
Platteit v.appears
Coreil, 145 So. 395 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
the separate creditor may not seize prior to payment of
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sarily the separate creditors' rights against community property are junior to those of community creditors. 197 If, however,
the husband himself is a community creditor, his separate creditors may claim all the rights which accrue to him thereby and
198
they may assert these rights judicially.
Creditors of the Wife
The wife's separate creditors may subject her separate property to their claims. 99 In respect to community property, the
wife's separate creditors are less favorably situated than, community creditors and the husband's separate creditors. The
wife's prenuptial creditors 200 and her separate creditors generally 201 cannot subject community property to their claims. At
the dissolution of the community, her separate creditors are
subordinate to community creditors in relation to community
property. 20 2 Because of this difference in rights, it is important
to determine which of the wife's creditors are also community
creditors.
• The power of the wife to obligate the community has been
thought a matter of difficulty due to article 2404 making the
husband head and master of the community; and refined
theories of quasi-contract, agency, and ratification have been
advanced to explain exceptions to the supposed rule that only
the husband can obligate the community.2 3 As previously observed, whether a debt is a community debt or a separate debt
usually depends on the nature of the debt, not on which spouse
incurs it. The courts early recognized this principle and enforced obligations against the community which were incurred
community debts. See Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23 So. 337 (1897).
But see Webre v. Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 7 So. 460 (1890).
197. See cases cited in note 150 supra.
198. See Heirs of Gee v. Thompson, 41 La. Ann. 348, 6 So. 548 (1889).
199. See, e.g., Dickerman v. Reagan, 2 La. Ann. 440 (1847); Shevnin v.
Grimmer, 119 So. 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
But cf. 3 PLANIOL 1071: "Personal creditors of the wife can proceed only
against the interests belonging to her. Hence they are limited to the naked
ownership of her separate property, because its usufruct belongs to the community."
200. See Greenleeze v. Penny, 1 La. 241 (1830) ; Waters v. Wilson, 3 Mart.
(N.S.) 135 (La. 1824); Flogny v. Hatch, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 82 (La. 1822);
Keyser v. James, 153 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; cf. Childers v. Johnsen, 6 La. Ann. 634 (1851).
201. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115 So. 575 (1928)
Demack Motors Co. v. Hallick, 119 So. 572 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
202. See cases cited in note 150 supra.
203. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV.
3, 36 (1959).
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by the wife. 20 4 As long as married women lacked capacity to
20 5
contract without authorization by the husband or the judge,
the principle could be comfortably applied: without proper
authorization the wife's contract was null; if properly authorized the contract was valid, but it was a community obligation
if the contract inured to the benefit of the community, for the
husband's authorization was taken as assent that the community be bound. 2 6 During this period, the great effort by creditors was to hold the wife liable for community debts, not to
hold the community liable for the wife's debts. 20 7 The married
women's emancipation acts made it possible for the wife to contract without authorization by the husband or the judge, 28 and

thereby removed the factor which had supported community
liability for debts incurred by the wife. Since that time, the
great effort by creditors has been to hold the community liable
for the wife's debts.
Various theories have been successfully employed to make
the community liable for debts incurred by the wife. If the wife
is a public merchant, the community, by disposition of law, is
liable with her for her business debts. 209 Similarly, there is no
difficulty in holding the community liable if the wife manifestly
is acting as agent of the community. 210 In these cases the implication is that the wife, as agent, is not personally liable for
the debt. 21' Other cases base community liability on the hus204. Scanlan & Co. v. Warwick, 10 La. Ann. 30-31 (1855) : "It is clear as
a general rule that debts contracted during the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains, and must be acquitted out of the common fund;
and it is immaterial whether contracted by the husband or wife." See also Trudeau v. Row, 23 La. Ann. 197 (1871) ; Fluke v. Martin, 26 La. Ann. 279
(1874) ; Graham v. Egan, 13 La. Ann. 546 (1858) ; Chauviere v. Fliege, 6 La.
Ann. 56 (1851) ; Wiley v. Hunter, 2 La. Ann. 806 (1847).
205. The disabilities of married women and the exceptions thereto remain in
the Code. See LA. CIVIL COnE arts. 121-135, 1786, 1787, 2397, 2398 (1870).
206. See Kennedy v. Bossiere, 16 La. Ann. 445 (1862). FRENCH CIVIL CODE
art. 1419 (1804) as interpreted by the courts makes the husband solidarily liable
with the wife when she contracts a community obligation with his authorization.
See 3 PLANIOL 1091, 1092. There is no corresponding article in the Louisiana
Code.
207. See cases cited in note 116 supra.
208. See LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
209. See LA. CIVIL CODa art. 131 (1870). See also Charles Lob's Sons, Ltd.
v. Karnofsky, 177 La. 229, 148 So. 34 (1933) ; Thorne v. Egan, 3 Rob. 329
(La. 1842) ; King v. Dearman, 105 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
210. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1787 (1870). See also Neiman-Marcus Co. v.
Viser, 140 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Motion Picture Advertising
Service v. Modica, 139 So. 80 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932) ; Smithson v. Jones,
130 So. 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) ; Perfection Garment Co. v. Lanasa, 7 La.
App. 31 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1927) ; cf. David v. Edwards, 108 So. 2d 828 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1959).
211. But of. Perdido Finance Co. v. Falgout, 77 So. 2d 896 (La. App. Orl.
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band's obligation to supply the wife's "necessaries, ' ' 212 or on
2
theories of implied agency, or of ratification. t8
Community liability for necessaries usually occurs while the
spouses are separated in fact. The wife obtains the food, clothing, and shelter she must have, on credit, and the creditor presents the bill to the husband who is held liable on his obligation

to support his wife. 214 It is doubtful that liability extends much
beyond such basic items; jewelry, for instance, apparently is

not a necessary.2 1 , The amount of necessaries for which the
community can be held liable in this manner is relative, varying
with the husband's income ;216 but there is no community liability at all if the husband is furnishing necessaries in an amount
which the court deems sufficient. 217 If the community is held

liable, it seems the wife is not personally liable. 218 In each case
in which the community has been held liable under this theory,
Cir. 1955) (wife signed her own and husband's name as co-makers of promissory
note; on finding she was authorized to sign husband's name, the court held them
solidarily liable).
212. See, LA. CIviL CODE art. 120 (1870).

213. Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 142 So. 2d 625, 626 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 243 La. 1084, 150 So. 2d 23 (1963): "A
husband, as head and master of the community is responsible for the purchases
made by the wife:
(a) When they are necessaries which he has otherwise refused to furnish;
(b) If he either expressly or impliedly authorized the wife to make the purchase ;
(c) If he later ratifies the purchase either expressly or impliedly."
214. Tricketts v. Viser, 137 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) (furniture)
Smith v. Viser, 117 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (groceries); D. H.
.Holmes Co. v. Huth, 49 So. 2d 875 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) (clothing) ;
D. H. Holmes Co. v. Van Ryper, 173 So. 584 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937), aff'd
sub noa. D. H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 188 La. 431, 177 So. 417 (1937)
(clothing) ; Feibleman & Co. v. O'Rourke, 124 So. 620 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1929) (clothing) ; Spring v. Barr, 120 So. 544 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929)
(housing) ; Overton v. Nordyke, 10 La. App. 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929)
(medical expenses).
215. D. H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 188 La. 431, 436, 177 So. 417, 418 (1937)
"There is nothing in that doctrine to compel a husband to pay for jewelry bought
by his wife, in her own name, and for her own use or adornment, while she is
living separate and apart from him."
1 216. See, e.g., D. H. Holmes Co. v. Huth, 49 So. 2d 875 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1951) ; of. Gus Mayer Co. v. Gasquet, 7 Orl. App. 199 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1910) (where the wife bought items equal to one-tenth of husband's annual
income the day after she left him, the husband was held not liable).
217. See Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115 So. 575 (1928) ; Aisene v.
Gehbauer, 70 So. 2d 781 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954) ; Mathews Furniture Co. v.
LaBella, 44 So.2d 160 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Keller-Zander, Inc. v. Copeland, 196 So. 527 (La. App. OrI. Cir. 1940), cert. denied; Surety Credit Co. v.
Monteleone, 119 So. 576 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929). The power of the wife to
so obligate the community for necessaries may terminate when the husband
begins paying alimony pendente lite. Compare Lopez v. Pampalone, 8 La. App.
729 (Orl. Cir. 1928) with Overton v. Nordyke, 10 La. App. 317 (Orl. Cir.
1929).
218. See Smith v. Viser, 117 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
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and the

community could properly be held liable without reference to
which spouse incurred the debt. Limiting community liability
to "necessaries" may be prudent, however, to prevent abuses
otherwise difficult to restrain or repair. This limitation, on the
other hand, should not be employed to relieve the community of
liability from the debt resulting from the wife's acquisition of
220
substantial community property.
There is language in some cases which indicates that the
wife is presumed to be agent of the community. 221 Leaving
aside the cases in which her agency was manifest, 222 such dicta
are apparently responsible only for the decision that the community is liable for the wife's purchases, subsequent to a separation in fact, on an account opened during the marriage, in
the absence of express notice to the creditor revoking the wife's
presumptive authority as agent. 223 Apparently the court will
224
be hard to convince that such revocation was communicated.
219. Support of the family is a community obligation. See text accompanying

note 52 aupra.
220. Mathews Furniture Co. v. LaBella, 44 So. 2d 160 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1950) seems misguided. While separated, wife purchased furniture on credit.
The court refused to hold the community liable as for necessaries without proof
that the husband had failed to provide them. By any criterion the furniture was
community property; therefore the community ought to pay for it. Rouchon v.
Rocamora, 84 So. 2d 873 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956) reaches the correct result
by a doubtful application of the "necessaries" theory. The wife leased the
premises in which she and her husband lived. The court properly held that the
community and not the wife was liable for the rent.
221. Keyser v. James, 153 So. 2d 97, 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) : "In situations where the wife contracts debts during the marriage, the law presumes an
agency relationship between the community as principal and the wife as agent."
Of. 3 PLANIOL no. 1099: "Wife is empowered to represent her husband as of
right, under an implied mandate, in the so-called household management acts,
that means the acquisition of necessary household provisions and other current
expenses." However, in French law, the wife's implied agency terminates if
the spouses are separated in fact. Id. no. 1100.
222. See cases cited in note 210 supra.
223. Goldring's Inc. v. Seeling, 139 So. 2d 538, 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962)
"Having permitted his wife to establish an account with Plaintiff, and having
paid her bills without question, the husband cannot, because of their later separation, refuse to pay her previous purchases of customary wearing apparel. In
this regard, be ratified the action of his wife as agent for the community to
purchase her necessary wearing apparel and kindred articles, which agency continued until expressly revoked. The husband has failed in his defense that he
gave notice of revocation of Plaintiff.
"Husband's liability for necessaries furnished his wife results from implied
agency in wife to contract on husband's behalf; and this presumption continues
until the occurrence of some event that changes the legal situation." NeimanMarcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) held the husband
liable for wife's purchases on an account after judicial separation but prior to
notification to the creditor. The decision seems correct as the agency was express; husband had opened the account and delivered the "charga-plate" to his
wife.
224. Goldring's Inc. v. Seeling, .139 So. 2d 588, 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)
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Although the decision is not entirely convincing, the moral

seems obvious: if community liability is to be restricted to
necessaries after a separation in fact, the husband must close
all charge accounts. If the restriction of community liability,

after such separation, to necessaries is sound, allowing unlimited liability by implied agency theories seems dubious. Agency
theories failed, for obvious reasons, to make the ex-husband liable for debts incurred by his ex-wife in operation of a former
community business which she purchased in partition proceed225
ings following divorce.
The ratification theory of community liability appears to be
a blend of ideas drawn from agency, estoppel, and perhaps
quasi-contract. The thought is that if the husband knows of a
purchase of some article by the wife and he allows it to be in-

stalled in the community residence without protest, he "ratifies" the purchase as an act of an authorized representative of
the community. 226 There is a fundamental flaw in this theory.
It is applied to acquisitions of property (furniture, household
appliances) which are presumed to be community property. If
the court is unable to find ratification of the wife's purchase,

the debt is her separate debt, and as a corollary it seems the
"He testified that he called at Plaintiff's place of business and notified someone
in the office, he could not identify, that he would not pay any more of his wife's
purchases. The lady in charge of the office testified they had no record of such
notification. It seems hardly reasonable to believe that Plaintiff would risk
selling to a wife once her husband notified it he would no longer be responsible
therefor."
225. Thompson v. Waterhouse, 157 So. 2d 300, 301 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)
"Plaintiff contends it was the duty of Waterhouse to notify him of the change
in ownership, and having failed to do so, he was responsible for debts incurred
by his wife after her purchase.
"This contention of Plaintiff is untenable. Irrespective of the fact that the
community owned the business and the husband was bound for its debts, once
the same was sold by judicial process at public auction, whether to the divorced
wife or a third person, the husband was not responsible for debts contracted
thereafter by the new owner. The judicial advertisement of the proposed partition sale at auction was notice to the public." Does the court imply that the
husband would be liable if there had been an amicable partition without judicial
sale? Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 235 La. 226, 103 So. 2d 226 (1958).
226. Montgomery v. Gremillion, 69 So. 2d 618, 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953)
"It is well settled in Louisiana that the husband is liable for purchases by his
wife when such are not necessaries if the husband knew of the purchases and
did nothing at the time to repudiate the debt and permitted the articles so purchased to be used for the benefit of the community. His responsibility arises
from his silence and inaction which are circumstances showing consent and
ratification. The acts of the husband from which ratification can be inferred
are such as must appear clearly and unequivocally, and ratification will not be
inferred where the acts can be otherwise explained." See Conley v. Johnson, 98
So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957); Hammond Fin. Co. v. Renfro, 87 So. 2d
216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) ; Breaux v. Decuir, 49 So. 2d 495 (La. App. l1tCir. 1950) ; Miller-Morgan Co. v. Beverung, 9 Or]. App. 287 (La. App. Or]. Cir.
1912).
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property must be her separate property. 227 This result is
achieved without any inquiry whether the wife has any paraphernal funds under her administration in spite of settled jurisprudence that such funds are a necessary prerequisite to the
wife's augmentation of her separate estate by acquisitions under
onerous title.2 2 8 The married women's emancipation acts did not
alter this rule. 2 " Thus a finding of a separate debt, and consequently separate property, for want of ratification of the purchase by the husband appears to be an unwarranted deviation
from settled principles of classification of property. The better mode of classifying the debt in these cases appears to be to
determine whether the acquired property is community or separate according to usual rules of classification of property. If
it is community property, surely the purchase price is a community debt; if the property is paraphernal, so also is the debt.
The husband's management of the community is not prejudiced
of commuby this procedure, for if he objects to an acquisition
23 0
nity property by the wife, he may annul the sale.
The law of negotiable instruments requires some modification of the preceding statements as Columbia Finance Corp. v.
Robitcheck23 1 illustrates. The wife purchased an air conditioning unit for the community residence and signed a negotiable
note for the unpaid balance. In the indorsee's suit on the note,
the court of appeal held that the husband had ratified the purchase and gave judgment against the community. 232 The Supreme Court reversed and gave judgment against the wife
only.233 Since the husband's signature was not on the note, he
could not be held liable on the note under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,2 34 and since the court refused to allow
an indorsee to sue on the original obligation underlying the
227. See Rahier v. Rester, 11 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; Lacaze v.
Kelsoe, 185 So. 676 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
228. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964).
229. See LA. R.S. 9:105 (1950). Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092,
36. So. 2d 396 (1948).
:230. See Thomas v. Winsey, 76 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
* 231. 243 La. 1084, 150 So. 2d 23 (1963), reversing 142 So. 2d 625 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
232. Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 142 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
233. Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 243 La. 1084, 150 So. 2d 23 (1963).
* 234. LA. R.S. 7:18 (1950) : "No person is liable on the instrument whose
gignature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly provided. But one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same
extent as if he had signed in his own name."
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note;, the husband could not be held liable for the note.28 5 Thus
it appears that if the wife signs a negotiable note, but the .husband does not, and delivers this to the vendor, the community
is liable for the purchase price if the vendor sues, since he may
disregard the note and sue on the original obligation; but if the
note is negotiated, the wife only is liable to the indorsee, at least
in the absence of an assignment of the original obligation to
him. If the wife borrows money and gives a negotiable note to
evidence the debt, there may well be no community liability if
the husband does not sign the note. 23 6 Clearly the husband is
not liable on the note. Community liability would have to be
predicated on the underlying obligation and it remains to be
seen whether the courts will be willing to inquire into the use
made of the borrowed funds in order to classify the debt, or
whether they will test community liability by theories of agency
or ratification. Practically, the creditor may have a difficult
task if he must prove ratification.
The wife may obligate the community by her torts as well
as by her contracts. The husband is not liable for the wife's
torts because of his relationship to her.237 The community, however, is liable for the wife's torts if it is "shown affirmatively
that she was expressly or impliedly authorized to and was, at
the time of the commission of the act, actually attending to the
affairs or business of the community.' ' 238 In automobile accident cases, the doctrine required a finding that the wife was on
a community mission. At first narrowly interpreted, 239 the
concept of community mission has been expanded to cover almost any legitimate pursuit in which the wife uses an automobile. 240 Although the plaintiff must allege that the wife was on
a community mission at the time of the tort, it appears that the
community has the burden of proof if it is to avoid liability on
24 1
the ground that the wife was not on a community mission.
235. Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 243 La. 1084, 1091, 150 So. 2d .23,
26 (1963).
236. But cf. Hammond Fin. Co. v. Renfro, 87 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1956). Wife assumed payment of note of another. Husband held liable on theory
he ratified the transaction by making several payments on the note. The case is
questionable in view of the Robitcheck decision.
237. See Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 124 So. 2d 904 (1960); Adams v.
Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
238. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 372, 174 So. 876, 879 (1937).
239. See, e.g., Wise v. Smith, 186 So. 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Tuck v.
Harmon, 151 So. 803 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) ; cf. Neibaum v. Campisi, 16
So. 2d 257 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
240. See Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 432, 46 So. 2d 614, 617 (1950).
241. See Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 124 So. 2d 904 (1960) ; Note, 21
LA. L. REV. 647 (1961).
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Community liability does not relieve the wife of liability for her
tort; they are liable in solido. 242 Community liability for the
wife's torts is of small practical importance today in autmobile
accident cases, as the wife usually will be an insured under the
vehicle owner's liability insurance policy. However, community
liability may become important by its extension to other type
243
tort cases.
Conclusion
The status of creditors' rights in a community property system has been the subject of complaint. 244 Indeed, satisfactory
adjustment of the relations between the spouses and third persons is one of the most rigorous tests which a workable community property system must pass. 245 The Louisiana community
system has done so. The rights of creditors in the Louisiana
community system have been reduced to a fairly coherent,
though complex, body of law. That the community still flourishes after the emancipation of married women, the transformation of property values (making movables key sources of
wealth), and the development of a credit economy, is evidence
of the adaptability of our law and its capacity to provide creditors with the protection they need.
Some improvements on the present law may be suggested.
First, recognition that as a general rule a debt is classified as
community or separate according to its nature, not according
to which spouse incurred it, would eliminate most of the anomalies in classification of debts. Second, the rights of separate
242. See Vail v. Spampinato, 238 La. 259, 115 So. 2d 343 (1959) ; Brantley
v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950) ; Galle v. Ingraham, 140 So. 2d
741 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
243. Cf. Moses v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 221 La. 364, 59 So. 2d
421 (1952). Husband, lessor, agreed to keep stairway lighted. Wife was in
charge of premises. Pursuing her hobby, photography, wife turned out lights.
Tenant fell down stairs. The husband's insurer was liable as wife was agent of
husband.
244. CLARK, COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY AND TIIm FAMILY IN NEW MEXICO
27-28 (1956): "In New Mexico, and perhaps a majority of the community
states, this area of the law is one of the most disorderly, impractical and confusing." See also Mecham, Creditors' Rights in Community Property, 11 WASH.
L. REV. 80 (1936).
245. Cf. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 261-62
(1962).,
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creditors, particularly those of the husband, against the community need clarification. Third, a frank recognition that the
wife is able to obligate the community in certain cases would
resolve most of the present difficulties in this area.
Karl W. Cavanaugh

TERMINATION

OF THE COMMUNITY'

The community begins with the marriage and ordinarily
regulates the property rights of the husband and wife, as between themselves, so long as the marriage lasts. Exceptionally,
this matrimonial property regime may terminate while the marriage subsists. Problems arise if the different events and procedures which terminate the community are not carefully distinguished, for principles applicable to one event or procedure
are not necessarily applicable to another.
The events and procedures which terminate the marital community may be classified according to two characteristics.
First, termination of the community may be direct or consequential. Termination is direct if it results from a procedure
designed primarily to terminate the community; otherwise, it
is consequential. Second, termination of the community may
be judicial or natural. If the termination occurs as a result of
court action, it is judicial; otherwise, it is natural. Thus the
causes for termination may be characterized as follows: (1)
separation of property, 2 direct and judicial; (2) death,3 conse1. Throughout this Comment, "termination" will be used, rather than the
term "dissolution," as "dissolution" may connote the process of liquidating the
community's assets-a topic beyond the scope of this Comment.
2. Although the Louisiana Civil Code does not expressly declare that the
separation of property dissolves the community, yet such is the legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the provisions on this subject. See Spencer v. Rist,
16 La. Ann. 318 (1861) ; Holmes v. Barbin, 15 La. Ann. 553 (1860).
3. The community ceases to exist on the death of either partner. See LA.
CIVIL CODE arts. 136, 2406 (1870) ; Vaccaro v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 932
(E.D. La. 1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Poutz v. Bistes, 15 La.
Ann. 636 (1860) ; Stewart v. Pickard, 10 Rob. 18 (La. 1845); Hart v. Foley,
10 Rob. 378 (La. 1842) ; Griffin v. Waters, 1 Rob. 149 (La. 1841) ; Broussard
v. Bernard, 7 La. 216 (1834) ; Succession of Evans, 8 Orl. App. 196 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1911).

